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Abstract 
 
 This Article corrects widespread misconception about whether complex 
regulatory systems can be fairly described as either “rules-based” or “principles-based” 
(also called “standards-based”).  Promiscuous use of these labels has proliferated in the 
years since the implosion of Enron Corp., with users exhibiting an increasing habit of 
celebrating systems dubbed principles-based and scorning those called rules-based.  
While the concepts of rules and principles (or standards) are useful to classify individual 
provisions, they are not scalable to the level of complex regulatory systems.  The Article 
uses examples from corporate law, securities regulation and accounting to illustrate this 
problematic phenomenon.  To describe or design systems as principles-based or rules-
based, analysis must account for the application and interaction of all provisions. Once 
these features are accounted for, the labels become facile.  The Article thus concludes 
that it is neither possible nor desirable to fashion such systems to be “principles-based” 
or “rules-based” and that such misleading labels should be retired.  
 
 The Article then explores why the rhetoric extolling “principles-based systems” is 
flourishing.  It considers three hypotheses: (1) a regulatory emphasis on discretionary 
enforcement to induce cautious compliance, (2) a quest to rejuvenate ethical principles in 
the practice of corporate law, securities regulation and accounting and (3) a deflective 
political strategy in jurisdictional competition to signal product differentiation.  The first 
and second hypotheses are credible but suffer from both descriptive and normative 
weaknesses, including how they can backfire by leading to overzealous enforcement.  The 
third is the strongest descriptively but is most troubling normatively.  Political effort to 
differentiate regulatory products using these labels is a form of misleading advertising. 
This deflection not only underscores the need to retire these labels, it also reveals a 
routinely overlooked limitation of jurisdictional competition in corporate law, securities 
regulation and accounting.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Many people seem to believe that legal or accounting systems can be either 
“rules-based” or “principles-based.”1  The numerous debacles epitomized by Enron Corp. 
drew worldwide attention to these labels.  Many attributed the debacles to weaknesses in 
the United States accounting system, which they classified as “rules-based.”2  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to study 
this claim.3  Within and outside the United States, policymakers seize on these categories 
to self-classify their legal and accounting systems and use these labels as grounds for 
promotion, reform or prescription.4 This Article contends that this regulatory enthusiasm 
for analysis positioned across the rules/principles axis is misplaced.   
 
 These classifications are too crude to describe or guide the design of corporate 
law, securities regulation or accounting systems.  Inquiry concerning the nature of rules 
and principles demonstrates how these labels invariably require sorting individual legal 
or accounting provisions onto a continuum rather than precisely fitting them into the 
categories.  Describing a system as principles-based or rules-based would require not 
only an inventory of all its provisions along that continuum but also account for how they 
are applied and how they interact.  Within large complex regulatory systems, assessment 
of the application and interaction of individual provisions may result in systemic qualities 
that differ significantly from one based on an inventory of the individual provisions.  
Moreover, a conscious effort to design a system to be either principles-based or rules-
based would require forcing individual provisions toward the poles.  To do so interferes 
                                                 
1  The phrase “standards-based system” is also used.  See infra text accompanying notes ___-___.  
 
2 E.g., HARVEY PITT, SEC CHAIRMAN, TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING 
AND URBAN AFFAIRS (asserting that US accounting is “based on rules, and not on broad principles”); FIN. 
ACCT. STANDARDS BD.: PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO U.S. STANDARD SETTING, NO. 107205 (Oct. 
2002); SENATE REPORT NO. 107-205, at 13 (2002); see Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, 
Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 421 (2004); William H. Widen, Enron at the 
Margin, 58 BUS. LAW. 961, 965 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the 
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1408-09 (2002); Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A New Ballgame for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 93-94 (2003); 
Anthony J. [sic], Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting 
Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 161-62 (2003). 
 
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 108(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7266; see infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
4 See, e.g., Cathy Quinn, Corporate Governance (Speech) (July 8, 2005) (New Zealand Securities 
Commissioner advertising the country’s “robust principles-based framework for good corporate 
governance” instead of a “more prescriptive rules-based approach”); Irish Financial Regulator (Rialtir 
Airgeadais) (Speech), Institute of European Affairs, Fin. Services Reg. (June 21, 2005) (“We are a 
principles-based regulator” and oppose “rules-based systems”); Irish Financial Regulator (Rialtoir 
Airgeadais) Annual Report 9 & 18 (2004) (same); Nicholas Le Pan, Financial Regulatory Outlook, 23 
CANADIAN NAT’L BANKING L. REV. 52 (Dec. 2004) (describing approach to corporate governance 
regulation as focused on behaviors addressed through “guidelines” that “are not rules,” including “such as 
boards making sure they have the information they need in the form they need it”). 
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with the benefits of the relationship among rules and principles and impairs tailoring the 
form of articulation to meet desired objectives. 
 
 Surveys of US corporate law and securities regulation and of US and international 
accounting illustrate the necessity and value of combining rules and principles and the 
difficulty of designing systems warranting classification as rules-based or principles-
based.  All these systems contain a blend of provisions ranging from the particular to the 
general, from those providing precise ex ante instruction to those defined after the fact.  
The provisions serve different ends and, because within large complex systems they are 
not isolated from one another, they are mutually informative.  Thus, corporate fiduciary 
duty laws bear principles-like attributes but interact with individual statutes and, through 
repeated applications in non-statutory contexts, they form a doctrinal structure bearing 
rule-like attributes. Anti-fraud principles in securities regulation and measurement 
principles in accounting interact with individual rules requiring specific disclosures and 
classifications to produce a coherent body of legal and accounting provisions.   
 
 Yet global rhetoric increasingly speaks of the availability of systems denominated 
as principles-based.  As countries develop corporate laws, debate centers on whether they 
should be formulated as rules-based or principles-based.5  US federal securities 
regulation is routinely criticized as rules-based, while the Canadian system is heralded as 
principles-based.6  Across the globe, many characterize the US accounting system as 
rules-based while calling the international accounting system principles-based.7  Within 
the US, regulators and compliers alike invoke such language when campaigning for 
favored provisions8 or championing state versus federal primacy in regulating public 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., South Africa Corporate Governance Code (2002) (“principles-based” not rules-based and 
“encourages directors to perform in the spirit of the code rather than simply applying the tick box 
approach”); Thailand Stock Exchange, The Principles of Good Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies (March 2006) (11-page statement of principles and best practices, none of which is binding).  
The Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada commissioned a study from me which 
initially asked which is superior, a rules-based or principles-based system of securities regulation, and 
ultimately involved elucidating some of the main characteristics of securities regulation in the United States 
and Canada.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Principles and Rules in Public and Professional Securities 
Law Enforcement: A Comparative US-Canada Inquiry (May 31, 2006). 
 
6 E.g., Ruth O. Kuras, Harmonization of Securities Regulation Standards between Canada and the US, 81 
U. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 465, 472 (2004); Allison Dabbs Garrett, Themes and Variations: The 
Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices in Major World Markets, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
137, 161 (2004) 
 
7 See Frederick Gill, Principles-Based Accounting Principles, 28 N. C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG.  967 
(2003); see also Matthew A. Melone, US Accounting Standards: Rules or Principles? The Devil Is Not in 
the Details, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161 (2004); Hervé Stolowy, Nothing Like the Enron Affair Could 
Happen in France!, 14 EURO. ACCT. REV. 405 (2005) (reviewing responses to Enron debacle among 
French accounting scholars, practitioners and policymakers); Kenneth Yong, Exploring Rules-Based and 
Principles-Based Accounting, ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 2004), p. 32 (international accounting is “popularly 
considered as being principles-based” while US GAAP is “branded with a rules-based reputation”). 
 
8  See, e.g., Piper Rudnik, Report on SEC Proposal on Executive Compensation (calling it less rules-based 
and more principles-based, meaning disclosing all material items, whether or not they fit squarely within a 
box of specific rules); Cynthia A. Glassman, (Speech), Tenth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute: Priorities 
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corporations.9  Overwhelmingly, rhetoric vaunts “principles-based systems” and 
denigrates “rules-based systems.” 
 
 Why this enthusiasm for principles-based systems, even though delivering them is 
improbable?  The Article explores three possible hypotheses.  One possibility, the 
regulatory hypothesis, is to provide a counterweight to strong systemic forces that 
demand and produce provisions bearing rule-like characteristics.  This response expands 
enforcement arsenals and thus can elicit more cautious compliance.  While this 
explanation for the language is credible, four limitations appear—two that question its 
normative desirability and two its descriptive accuracy.   
 
 Normatively, this strategy can induce excessively cautious compliance outlooks 
that impair the benefits of rules and backfire as unfair or illegitimate if enforcement is 
biased towards principles without sufficient regulatory guidance in rules.  Descriptively, 
the hypothesis is weak because the demand for rules always is offset by regulatory use of 
principles to fortify enforcement arsenals and the rhetoric does not speak of a balance of 
principles and rules but trumpets “principles-based systems” and denigrates “rules-based 
systems.” 
 
 A second possibility, the ethical hypothesis, is that the pro-principles rhetoric 
reflects desire to promote ethical values rather than expressing concern for the form of 
articulated legal and accounting provisions.  What the Enron-type debacles showed was 
not so much the dangers of rules but manifest violation of a different set of principles 
addressed by business and professional ethics.  This interpretation suggests that the 
language is ultimately a call for policymakers to emphasize those ethics, and targeted 
actors to abide them.  While also credible, two qualifications appear, one normative, one 
descriptive.  
 
 Descriptively, such a call to ethical rejuvenation implicitly assumes a decline in 
ethics during the relevant period, which may or may not be justified.    Normatively, this 
strategy could backfire too.  Exhortations to abide the spirit of laws project a moral 
appeal that may be desirable.  But rhetorical stories of principles-based systems could 
produce belief that rules can be subordinated or eliminated which, ensuing analysis 
suggests, is neither possible nor wise.  
 
 A third possibility, the political hypothesis, views proponents of principles-based 
systems as attempting to signal product differentiation in jurisdictional competitions 
designed to maintain or expand authority.  This is the most convincing explanation as a 
descriptive matter.  Under this account, Delaware judges promote their state’s corporate 
law as principles-based to forestall increased federal regulation, which they criticize as 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Concerns at the SEC (March 9, 2006) (SEC Commissioner reporting her effort in 2003 to make 
management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) disclosure less obscure by adopting an SEC “interpretive 
release that provided principles-based guidance to help get MD&A back on point”). 
 
9 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the 
Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1 (2005). 
 
 5
rules-based;  British Columbia advances a principles-based system to challenge Ontario’s 
dominance in Canadian securities regulation; countries that say they offer principles-
based systems signal that they are mature enough to honor principles without the need for 
detailed rules; and international accounting promulgators promote their product as 
principles-based against US GAAP, which they rebuke as rules-based, to gain leadership 
in establishing the global accounting system. 
 
 Although the political hypothesis is descriptively appealing, it is normatively 
troubling.  If it is impossible to devise “principles-based systems,” then promoting them 
is misleading.   In addition to how this undermines the hortatory aspirations of the ethical 
hypothesis, it exposes a negative by-product of the jurisdictional competition that results 
in such linguistic overstatement.  This potential for misleading rhetoric has been 
overlooked in the literature concerning jurisdictional competition. Explicitly recognizing 
it not only supports retiring the misleading labels, it identifies a new limitation on the 
efficacy of jurisdictional competition. 
 
 To reach these conclusions, the Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I reviews the 
literature on rules and principles, showing considerable struggles concerning matters of 
classification and trade-offs as well as of labeling.  Extending this literature from 
individual provisions to entire systems, discussion justifies skepticism about whether it is 
feasible to describe or design such system as “principles-based” or “rules-based.”   
 
 Part II focuses on corporate law, securities regulation and accounting.  It first 
surveys major substantive provisions in these fields to demonstrate the presence of a 
range of provisions, from rules to principles, whose application and interaction frustrates 
simplistic characterization of the systems as rules-based or principles-based.  It then 
reviews proposed system designs that illustrate how even conscious efforts to avoid 
having an interactive mixture of provisions do not succeed. 
 
 Part III considers three possible explanations for the fashionable rhetoric extolling 
principles-based systems in corporate law, securities regulation and accounting.  It 
explores the hypotheses that attribute this phenomenon to promoting regulatory 
capabilities or ethical values and summarizes their descriptive and normative weaknesses.  
Analysis of the hypothesis that political factors explain the phenomenon is shown to be 
the most descriptively accurate but normatively most troubling.  In addition to adding a 
reason to doubt the virtue of jurisdictional competition, this cements the case to retire as 
misleading the labels “rules-based” and “principles-based” to describe legal or 
accounting systems. 
 
I.  THE DYNAMICS OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES 
 
 Rules and principles are individual forms of articulation constituting components 
of larger regulatory systems that, in varying degrees, enable regulators to communicate 
expectations and provide people with guidance about what is required or permitted.   
Legal scholars continually struggle to delineate the categories of individual rules and 
principles and assess their relative merits.  The difficulties associated with the treatment 
of individual provisions multiply when attempting to analyze the characteristics of the 
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larger complex regulatory systems of which the individual provisions are fragments.  
This Part reviews some of the extensive literature, taking the analysis as evidence that it 
is impossible and undesirable to design a system fairly characterized as principles-based 
or rules-based.  
 
A.  Treatment of Individual Provisions 
 
 The following sub-sections discuss the literature concerning treatment of 
individual provisions as rules and principles.  Analysis suggests that rules and principles 
are best conceived as residing along a continuum according to a provisions’ relative 
vagueness and posing subtle trade-offs.  The ensuing section shows that the difficulties of 
treating individual provisions multiply when addressing large complex regulatory 
systems. 
 
 1.  Labels — A preliminary difficulty in the literature concerning rules and 
principles concerns labels which, many scholars observe, are fraught with ambiguity and 
confusion.10  Scholars often invoke a simple polarity concerning driving regulations to 
illustrate two alternative expressions of a legal or accounting provision.  One formulation 
provides specific directives defined ex ante (such as a 55 mph speed limit) while another 
provides general directives whose specific content is defined ex post (such as to drive at a 
reasonable rate of speed).  Scholars assign different labels to such illustrations.   
 
 The first formulation invariably is called a rule and the second often is called a 
standard.  Some legal scholars use the term principle while others use the word 
standard11 or use them interchangeably.12  Some use the term principle to denominate the 
animating purpose of a stated rule.  In turn, some scholars use the word standards to 
capture both rules and principles so understood.13  Others reserve the label principles for 
the different idea of background justifications for laws or other commands (whether 
rules, standards or something else).  Increasingly, analysts use the label standards to 
denote a measure of performance or conduct, often established by non-governmental 
organizations (as in Internet standards or credit rating standards).14  
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-59, n. 231 (1992); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 379, at n. 16 (1985); Louis Kaplow, Rules and Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 559 at n. 2 (1992). 
 
11 See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22-25 (1967); RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 22-28, 71-80 (1977); John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of 
Legal Certainty, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 47, at n. 2 (2002). 
 
12 See Sullivan, supra note ___, at 58 n. 231 (citing Professors Dworkin, Schauer and Radin); see also 
Kaplow, supra note ___, at  559 at n. 2 (noting that “Outside the debate over formulation of the law, the 
terms are often used interchangeably”). 
 
13 This is the dominant approach in the accounting literature.  See Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on 
the Effects of Principles- and Rules-Based Standards, 17 ACCT.  REV. 91 (2003). 
 
14 See Symposium, Owning Standards, 48 B.C.  L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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 The discordant labels also emerge in practice.  Corporate law’s “business 
judgment rule” can be seen as a broad principle—a judicial presumption that corporate 
officials act with due care.  In the US, the shorthand reference of “Rule 10b-5” is 
invariably used to designate securities regulation’s most vague and open-ended anti-fraud 
principles.  Accounting terminology offers GAAP (generally accepted accounting 
principles) and GAAS (generally accepted auditing standards), both of which contain a 
mixture of provisions fairly denominated as rules, principles or standards. 
 
 The proliferation of contradictory labels may simply suggest that such labels 
mean little.  Indeed, some dismiss the confusion that the stew creates in legal theory as 
mere nominalism, which does not impair analysis.15  However, it is possible that the 
disagreement on labeling reveals something more substantive about these ideas and how 
useful they are as analytical tools.  One possibility is that the categories are inevitably 
unstable.  As discussed below, this instability supports conceiving of the content in the 
categories (rules, principles, standards) as residing on a continuum across which 
provisions operate iteratively, meaning that their substantive meaning is mutually 
informative.   
 
 For now, the question of terms in legal and accounting theory requires authors to 
state vocabulary choices at the outset of any analysis.  As a contrast to rules, I will use 
the term principles, in part, because that is the commonly used term in contemporary 
rhetoric and this, in turn, suggests that something more is at stake in labeling than many 
suppose.16  I also choose the word principles rather than standards to reflect how the 
latter term increasingly is used to designate performance or conduct measures, not legal 
provisions that are contrasted with rules.  
 
 2.  Classification — A more important difficulty is the problem of classifying 
given provisions as rules or principles.  The common illustration from driving regulations 
(the rule of 55 mph versus the principle of reasonableness) is easy but incomplete.  The 
following notes three classification methodologies—what I call analytical, conceptual 
and functional—and concludes by suggesting that these are united by the single quality of 
a provision’s relative vagueness.  
 
 A common analytical approach to classifying laws as rules or principles uses their 
temporal orientation.  It distinguishes when content is provided: rules define boundaries 
ex ante while principles define them ex post.17  In securities regulation, brokers know 
that they are not allowed to make unauthorized trades for clients (a rule) but may not 
know whether other behavior exhibits commercial honor until it is evaluated after the fact 
(a principle).  Thus rules and principles are sometimes classified according to how much 
                                                 
15 Braithwaite, A Theory of Legal Certainty, supra note ___, at n.2. 
 
16 See infra text accompanying notes ___-___ (discussing how rhetoric promoting principles-based legal 
and accounting systems may be related to promoting principles of business ethics). 
 
17 See Kaplow, supra note ___.   
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guidance they provide to actors ex ante—how much certainty is provided.  Notably, in 
this view, both rules and principles can be either complex or simple.   
 
 A weakness of the temporal classification is that the expression of any legal 
provision is always ex ante whereas its application is always ex post.  To that extent, the 
method only distinguishes articulations according to whether one has been applied or not.   
Put differently, the temporal classification carries an implicit assumption that an 
articulated provision can determine its future application, which it cannot.18  True, the 
circumstances in which such resulting uncertainty arises may be few or yield only modest 
uncertainty.  Still, the tool does not enable completely classifying all provisions into 
discrete categories of rule and principle.  Instead, provisions offer varying degrees of 
certainty and thus array across a spectrum from rule-like to principle-like. 
 
 A more conceptual classification views rules and principles in terms of designated 
attributes such as their relative generality versus specificity, abstractness versus 
concreteness and universality versus particularity.  Provisions characterized by 
generality, abstractness or universality are principles while those being specific, concrete 
and particular are rules.  Provisions bearing a mix of these attributes are more or less 
principles-like or rules-like.  Thus, as examples, a provision that is general and abstract 
but not universal is principle-like while a provision that is specific and particular but 
abstract is rule-like.  Sub-qualities bearing on these attributes include the extent of a 
provision’s clarification, detail, exceptions or limitations.   
 
 In securities regulation, the directive to exhibit “commercial honor” is a principle 
because it is general, abstract and universal.19 A broker’s duty to warn customers of the 
hazards of penny stock investment vehicles is a rule because it is specific, concrete and 
particular.20  A directive that companies disclose information “on a rapid and current 
basis” is principle-like because it is general and universal but also concrete.21 A directive 
that brokers invest for clients only in high-grade securities is rule-like because it is 
particular and specific but still abstract.22   
 
 This conceptual approach thus results in arraying provisions along a continuum 
from principle to rule, classified according to how many of the various attributes of rule 
or principle characterize a provision.23  Although the continuum metaphor has 
                                                 
18 Cf. Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 630 (1944) (no writing can prove its 
own completeness). 
 
19 NASD Manual, Rule NASD Rule 2110 (“A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high 
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade”). 
 
20 Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990; SEC Rule 15g-1 through 9. 
 
21 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Act, § 501, amending 15 U.S.C. 78o-6. 
 
22 See Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 679 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 
23 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
823, 828-32 (1991) (using the continuum metaphor); Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, supra note 
___, at 57 (same); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN.  L. REV. 577, 604-610 
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considerable appeal, a few scholars question how useful or rigorous the imagery is.24  
Indeed, a limitation of this conceptual approach is that there is no logical limit to the 
number or type of attributes that might be used in the classification process and there is 
no crisp way to rank their magnitude or importance.  At best, the result is a classification 
scheme bearing a fuzzy logic, in which intuition plays as much a role as hard-headed 
conceptualization.   
 
 Finally, a functional approach to classifying a legal or accounting provision as a 
rule or a principle considers the scope of discretion reposed in designated actors.  The 
more discretion a provision reposes the more it is principle-like and the less discretion 
reposed the more it is rule-like.   This approach is satisfactory only in those rare 
circumstances involving limited groups of actors.  For example, if a provision relates 
only to legislatures and judges, this approach can weigh how much discretion the 
legislature reposes in judges.  However, the utility of this classification declines with 
increasing numbers of actor groups.  
 
 Provisions that purport to restrict a given actor’s discretion by rule-like precision 
may increase discretion in other actors.  For example, legislatively-established criminal 
sentencing guidelines limit judicial discretion concerning punishment.  But they increase 
prosecutorial discretion when making charging decisions.  In accounting, using a rule or 
principle to constrain or create managerial discretion simultaneously affects the relative 
discretion held by auditors engaged to review managerial decisions.25  
 
 A weakness of all the foregoing classification methods is that they do not 
necessarily enable classifying all the possible permutations that legal or accounting 
provisions can assume.  A large portion of laws (and many accounting provisions) do not 
fit either category, however specified, nor do some provisions readily appear to reside 
between the poles.  Consider factor tests.26  A law against market manipulation, for 
example, may be tested according to factors such as the timing, frequency and structure 
of given securities trades.27  Similarly, corporate laws and securities regulations can use 
                                                                                                                                                 
(synthesizing the virtues of “crystalline” and “muddy” articulations of legal provisions, akin to the iterative 
conception). 
 
24 See James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line–Balancing Test Continuum, 
27 ARIZ.  ST.  L. J. 773, 776-777 (1995) (conceiving of a rules-principles continuum is an analytical dead-
end, a matter of technique rather than bearing normative significance); Scott Brewer, Exemplary 
Reasoning, Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 925, 972 (1996) (dismissing the notion of a continuum on grounds that it conflates distinct 
phenomena of logic and semantics that must be kept distinct). 
 
25 See Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of Principles- and Rules-Based Standards, 17 
ACCT.  REV. 91 (2003). 
 
26 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 963-964 (1995). 
 
27 See infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
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presumptions that may be rebutted.  These may or may not exhibit principle-like or rule-
like qualities.28   
 
 Any approach to classifying legal or accounting provisions as rules or principles 
is thus contestable and leaves room for refinement.  Yet uniting all the varying 
classification methods is a kind of super-ordinate attribute: vagueness. Principles are 
vaguer compared to rules which are less vague.  Vagueness is greater when a provision 
offers less ex ante guidance because much of its definitional content is provided only ex 
post; vagueness is increased by the features of abstractness, generality, and universality; 
and provisions are vaguer when they repose greater discretion in actors compared to 
those that constrain discretion. While admittedly imperfect, in the ensuing discussion and 
analysis I treat provisions as classifiable along a rules-principles spectrum according to 
their relative vagueness.   
 
 3.  Trade-Offs — Perhaps the most difficult problem appearing in the literature on 
rules and principles concerns trade-offs when choosing which to favor.   The literature 
acknowledges some reasonable approximations of trade-offs and yet scholars challenge 
their overall validity.  To illustrate, consider how the legal obligations of securities 
brokers should be stated as to whether to recommend a security.  One possibility is a rule-
like provision that prohibits recommending anything other than AAA-rated bonds.  
Another is a principle-like directive requiring that the broker evaluate the investment’s 
suitability in relation to a customer’s risk tolerance and investment objectives.   
 
 The rule appeals for its relative certainty and predictability; the principle appeals 
for its relative capacity to exploit advantageous circumstances and possibly avoid 
undesirable ones.  On the downside, rules can be blueprints for evading their underlying 
purposes.  Bright lines and exceptions to exceptions facilitate strategic evasion, allowing 
artful dodging of a rule’s spirit by literal compliance with its technical letter.  Rules can 
benefit resourceful and informed parties (such as brokers) yet harm reliant and ignorant 
ones (such as customers).29  In rapidly-changing environments, such as securities 
markets, rules can become obsolete faster than principles do.30  Principles may promote 
conservatism among regulated actors, protect other participants and have longer shelf-
lives.   But they pose problems of uncertainty and ex post surprise, which can impair 
achieving goals such as, in securities regulation, market efficiency and public perceptions 
of fairness. 
 
 Promulgation and compliance costs vary.  In general, rules are more costly than 
principles to create and principles are more costly than rules to comply with.31 When 
                                                 
28 See Ruth Gavison, Legal Theory and the Role of Rules, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727, 750-752 
(1991). 
 
29 See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting out of Securities Regulation 
by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 562-563 (1999). 
 
30 See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 
1265 (2003). 
 
31 See Kaplow, supra note ___. 
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rules enable relatively cheap compliance, compliance is more likely; but when principles 
mean compliance is relatively costly, non-compliance risk rises.32
 
 The desirability of a rule or principle may be clearer in some cases than in others.  
The clarity depends on the possibility of defining the importance of relative objectives.  
This conventionally involves determining which are more important, predictability and 
certainty or fairness and context.  In general, constraining discretion to promote 
predictability and certainty dictates adopting rules; emphasizing fairness and contextual 
sensitivity leads to the formulation of principles.   
 
 Yet the precise trade-off between certainty and context is not always clear.   A 
principle can be more certain than a dense weave of rules.33  For example, a vague 
articulation can yield a well-understood meaning while a densely specified series of 
articulations can yield competing understandings.  The Sherman Antitrust Act may be 
vague when using the terms contract, conspiracy and restraint of trade but shared 
understanding of the meaning of these terms combine to give a more rule-like quality to 
the statute.  While such shared understandings may have more to do with the nature of 
language and meaning than with the nature of rules and principles, language and meaning 
cannot be divorced from an evaluation of the trade-offs associated with principles versus 
rules.  
 
 Moreover, rules may promote certainty in a given context but export uncertainty 
to others; principles may promote flexibility in given contexts but also show 
“expansionist tendencies” that curtail flexibility in others.34  Nor are the alternatives 
always trade-offs.  A combination of certainty and contextual sensitivity is possible. To 
provide certainty, a rule must be flexible; to be open-ended, a principle must be stable.35  
These observations make it difficult to contend that rules always provide more certainty 
than principles or that principles always provide more contextual sensitivity than rules.  
Indeed, rules may be more certain for contexts that are simple, stable and involve small 
stakes but less certain when addressed to complex, dynamic, high-stakes contexts.36  This 
is especially so when new rules are adopted and subject to change during implementation 
and evolution.37   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
32  See id. 
  
33 See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue Code or Body of Principles?, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1702, 1703 (2006) (demonstrating, in the context of the Fourth Amendment, how 
“principled rules provide clearer guidance to law enforcement and citizens than arbitrary ‘bright-line’ 
rules”). 
 
34 Schlag, Rules and Standards, supra note ___, at 411-14 
 
35  Id. at 405-407.  
 
36 See Braithwaite, A Theory of Legal Certainty, supra note ___; RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 48 (1990). 
 
37 See Brett H. McDonnell, SOX Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 529 (making this point in the 
context of the rules-heavy Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
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*  * * 
 
 To summarize, the literature addressing rules and principles reflects considerable 
struggle, especially as to classification and trade-offs and even as to labeling.  This is due, 
in part, to how laws (and accounting provisions) address vast territories, pursue varying 
objectives and assume a wide variety of forms, complexity, notice content and production 
methods.  True, individual provisions can be classified along a rules-principles spectrum 
according to their relative vagueness and associated trade-offs can be worked out for 
designing provisions to suit objectives.  Yet the foregoing review suggests that these are 
neither simple nor incontestable matters even at the level of treating individual 
provisions.   
 
B.  Treatment of Entire Systems 
 
 The issues discussed in the preceding section become impossibly complex and 
contestable when one tries to describe entire systems as either “rules-based” or 
“principles-based.”  Descriptions of large complex regulatory systems must assess not 
only the character of all their individual provisions but also how those provisions are 
interpreted, enforced and applied as well as how they interact.  Accounting for all these 
factors casts doubt upon the analytical utility of using the binary terminology of “rules-
based” versus “principles-based” to describe such systems.   
 
 1.  Threshold —  The simplest way to reach a characterization of a system as 
“rules-based” or “principles-based” would be based on an inventory of the form in which 
individual provisions are expressed.  At this simple level, a principles-based system is 
one in which all, a majority or the most important articulations are vague and a rules-
based system is in one which such provisions are non-vague.  In considering whether 
such systems are possible or desirable as a threshold matter, it would be important to 
provide a theoretical or philosophical foundation for favoring either.    
 
 It is difficult to provide such foundations.  Consider two alternative intellectual 
traditions that address relative preferences for rules versus principles within a system: law 
and economics and critical theories.  While each may support a systemic preference for 
rules or principles, this support is too limited to defend systemic classifications of rules-
based or principles-based. 
 
 Law-and-economics scholarship addressing rules and principles guides analysis 
according to a desire to detail law as efficiently as possible.38  Theorists seek the optimal 
precision of law,39 informed by formal characterization of associated costs.40  A 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
38 See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 
257, 262 (1974). 
 
39 See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65 (1983). 
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decidedly directive stance in this tradition is to promote certainty. This means a general 
preference for stating posited law in the form of rules, rather than principles.41  But since 
principles also can promote certainty, this analysis cannot defend a system fairly 
characterized as rules-based.  Indeed, contemporary economic analysis increasingly 
favors principles, especially when informed by behavioral theories, which question how 
much certainty rules provide as compared to principles,42 or by game theory, which 
explores how principles may be better than rules to facilitate bargaining and neutralize 
strategic behavior.43
 
 At the other extreme, critical theories may be invoked to support the virtues of 
principles compared to rules.  Important work in this tradition positions the normative 
forms of argument favoring rules or principles in terms of political consciousness.  A 
leading illustration is how arguments favoring rules can resemble the form of arguments 
that favor individualism and how arguments favoring principles can resemble the form of 
arguments that favor altruism.44  An example of this parallel is how arguments favoring 
principles include that they can promote contextual sensitivity.  To the extent that one 
prefers the forms of argument favoring altruism one may likewise support favoring a 
legal system that uses principles whenever possible.   
 
 Yet this methodology restates the rules-principles argument in other terms, in this 
case by analogy to individualism-altruism.  The analysis that suggests that rules and 
principles reside along a continuum could likewise be restated: people are rarely either 
purely individualistic or purely altruistic but show varying degrees of such attributes in 
varying contexts.  Furthermore, principles do not have a monopoly on promoting 
contextual sensitivity, a virtue that rules can also promote.  Thus, as with economic 
analysis, this conceptualization does not enable defending the creation or maintenance of 
systems that rely exclusively or predominantly on principles rather than rules. 
 
 2. Applications — Even if one could simply inventory the character of individual 
provisions within a system to classify them as rules-based or principles-based, and defend 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 See, e.g., Kaplow, Rules and Standards, supra note ___; see also Gavison, Legal Theory and the Role of 
Rules, supra note ___, at ___. 
 
41 See, e.g., Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note ___, at 590-595 (not necessarily endorsing, but elucidating 
this position); Clifford Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 322-26 
(1985). 
 
42 See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 23 (2000); Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An 
Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) 
 
43 See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean 
Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995). 
 
44 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); see 
also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 
(1982). 
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it according to objectives such as certainty or contextual sensitivity, this simple exercise 
is incomplete.  Suppose that an inventory of the individual provisions that comprise US 
securities regulation or accounting justify the common descriptions of these systems as 
“rules-based.”  To sustain that characterization for the system as a whole would also 
require accounting for how those provisions are interpreted, enforced and applied. 
 
 Individual provisions may be classifiable as either rule or principle when stated as 
a legal norm but they are subject to a separate set of decision norms that govern their 
application.45  For example, a decision norm may guide judges toward either a formalistic 
or instrumentalist methodology.  A provision fairly classified as a rule may retain that 
character when applied using a formalist (or literalist) methodology but may assume the 
attributes of a principle when applied using an instrumentalist (or purposive or dynamic) 
methodology.  These two levels of definition thus complicate any claim that a legal 
system is principles-based or rules-based.   
 
 These complexities can be dramatized by comparing descriptions of national legal 
systems.  Consider the following example of alternative conceptions of such systems:46   
 
 In some legal cultures, it is generally understood that rules should 
be read literally, that the appliers and interpreters of rules should not be 
empowered to modify the rules at the point of application, that judges 
should interpret rules according to their ordinary meaning except in the 
most egregious cases, and that the virtues of specificity and predictability 
are more important, especially within the legal system, than the virtues of 
flexibility in the face of changing or unforeseen circumstances.  .  .  . 
 
 In other legal systems, by contrast, the virtues of rule-ness and 
formality are less apparent, and it is widely accepted that reaching the 
correct outcome in the individual case is more important than the virtues 
brought by rigid obedience to specific rules.  In these societies, the rule-
ameliorating devices, rather than being scorned, are celebrated, and rule-
interpreters, rule-enforcers, and rule-appliers who refuse to employ these 
devices are typically castigated with epithets like “mechanistic” and 
“formalistic.” 
 
 Using prevailing global jargon, at least in terms of the application of laws, the 
first conception might be called a rules-based system and the second a principles-based 
system.  Which better describes the US legal system?  In prevalent global classifications, 
especially in securities regulation and accounting, the US system is depicted as rules-
based while other national systems and international accounting are dubbed principles-
based.47  The foregoing passage continues as follows: 
                                                 
45 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
 
46 Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 303, 320-321. 
 
47 See supra notes 1 & 7 (citing sources). 
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 As should be apparent, there is a widespread view, supported by 
some moderately serious research, that the US is the best example of the 
latter, and that most other advanced legal systems are at least somewhat 
closer to the former than is the US.   
 
 Interestingly, this conclusion (which seems correct) contradicts prevailing global 
classification—at least as it concerns securities regulation and accounting.  This may 
simply reflect that the foregoing descriptions concentrate on application rather than initial 
formulation.  It also may simply mean that those subjects are special cases (and that 
accounting is not law in the US).   
 
 More generally, however, this contrast is congruent with the difficulties sampled 
in the previous section concerning classification of individual provisions as rules or 
principles and navigation of the trade-offs that individual provisions pose.  When 
positioned in the broader context of entire systems that must also take account of the 
norms of decision-making, the credible but contradictory descriptions justify more 
skepticism about whether “rules-based” or “principles-based” can be analytically reliable 
descriptions of any comprehensive legal system (or accounting system). 
 
 3.  Interactions — Beyond the crude exercise of inventorying the character of 
individual provisions and the additional complexity of addressing how those provisions 
are applied, one must consider the further complexity that arises from how individual 
provisions interact within a system.  Adding this complexity fortifies skepticism about 
such systemic labeling.   
 
 Consider the simple driving regulation illustration appearing in the rules versus 
principles literature.  An individual speed limit can be stated more vaguely (a reasonable 
speed) or less vaguely (55 mph).  Which is superior for a given roadway varies according 
to numerous factors, such as traffic volume and patterns, safety, serenity and energy 
conservation.  Taking account of these factors, no functional system could establish either 
as the law for all roads within it.   
 
 Indeed, a law designating the speed limit as 55 mph on a given roadway implicitly 
endorses that as a reasonable speed.  A principle directing drivers to cruise at a 
reasonable speed requires assigning meaning to the word reasonable which would be 
interpreted, in part, in relation to zones carrying a designated limit.  So a system of 
driving regulations invariably contains a mixture of rules and principles.  Good examples 
are laws that prohibit driving faster than a reasonable speed notwithstanding any 
particular posted limits or driving at a reasonable speed but in no event exceeding 35 
mph.  Such systems in which rules and principles co-exist and interact are neither rules-
based nor principles-based.  
 
 The same interaction of rules and principles appears in virtually any complex 
legal system.  Consider two individual provisions contributing to the law of insider 
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trading within the larger system of US securities regulation.  Section 16(b) provides a 
“short-swing profit” rule which penalizes certain kinds of insider trading by officers and 
directors;48 Section 10(b) contains broad anti-fraud principles that have been interpreted 
to prohibit insider trading by officers, directors and many other persons.49  It is possible 
to conceive of the rule and the principle as substitutes.50  If a system contained only the 
rule it could be called rules-based and if it contained only the principle it could be called 
principles-based. What is the proper characterization when a system uses both, as in the 
US? 
 
 The two provisions interact in complex ways that prevent citing either of them to 
support characterizing the system as rules-based or principles-based.  The rule of 16(b) 
compels disgorgement of short-swing profits, meaning gains on securities transactions by 
designated insiders within a stated time period without regard to intent.  The principle of 
10(b) makes it criminal for unspecified insiders to trade in securities on the basis of 
material non-public information. The two laws share a similar general purpose, of 
prohibiting securities market profit-making based on selectively available information, 
but Section 10(b) advances a fairness objective in relation to external shareholders while 
Section 16(b) also advances a management regulation objective in relation to business 
operations.51   
 
 The rule’s designation of certain corporate insiders and transactions promotes 
certainty that the principle’s open-endedness otherwise prevents.52  In some cases, issues 
arising under one of the provisions can be useful in discerning the appropriate application 
of the other, as where a problem that the rule does not address is sufficiently handled by 
                                                 
48 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (designated insiders must disgorge profits from securities transactions occurring within 
a six-month window). 
 
49 15 U.S.C. 78j; Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); see 
infra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
50 Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, supra note ___, at 321-25 (treating these provisions 
as substitutes).   
 
51  See Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 391, 399 (1991) (making the case that the purpose of §16(b) was to prevent insiders from 
manipulating corporate operations to induce favorable stock price fluctuations); Roberta S. Karmel, The 
Relationship between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibition against Insider Trading: Why a Property 
Rights Theory of Inside Information is Untenable (Book Review) 59 BROOKLYN L. REV. 149, n. 51 (1993) 
(§16(b)’s benefits not achieved by §10(b) are promoting long-term rather than short-term outlook among 
management and discouraging them from manipulating events over the short term); Merritt B. Fox, Insider 
Trading Deterrence versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2088 (1994) (reconciling the overall framework); but see Marleen O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient 
Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 309 (1989).    
 
52 See Steven R. Salbo, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global Marketplace: A Uniform Statutory 
Approach, 66 TUL. L. REV. 837, 861 (1992) (“Clear and precise regulation of insider trading would 
eliminate the need for section 16(b)”).   
 
 17
the principle.53  The presence of both provisions and their interaction shows the difficulty 
of the simple method of inventorying all provisions within a system to classify it as 
principles-based or rules-based.   
 
 Consider a broader illustration of how individual provisions that make up the 
larger system of federal securities regulation interact.  At stake in contexts governed by 
Section 10(b) are broad principles of materiality and disclosure.  Invocation of those 
concepts in one context illuminates their meaning in others, including in contexts to 
which separate rules apply.  For example, a fact is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in making an investment 
decision.54   
 
 Under that definition, rules that mandate disclosure using mechanical tests can be 
understood to designate such information as material.55  Thus Section 13(d) requires 
owners of 5% or more of the voting power in registered equity securities of any company 
to disclose specific information about their equity position and intent with respect to 
corporate control.56  Such a rule can be justified on the grounds that investors would 
consider such ownership and plans to be important as the materiality principle defines it.    
Section 13(d) may be a rule and Section 10(b) a principle but the interaction between 
them contributes systemic qualities that frustrate tidy categorization of the system as 
rules-based or principles-based. 
 
 4.  Benefits — Even if one were to decide that a system’s inventory of 
expressions is or should be “principles-based” or “rules-based,” that those attributes are 
sustained through both their applications and interactions, it would remain difficult to 
contend that a commitment to those systemic qualities is desirable.  At a basic level, 
interactions among individual rules and principles within a larger system can produce 
numerous benefits.  Apart from enabling a closer fit between form and objectives, these 
benefits include the following. 
 
                                                 
53 See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 255 (1976) (while §16(b)’s scope is 
unaffected by whether other sanctions might inhibit abuse of inside information, §10(b) is available to 
handle some of those other problems not addressed by §16(b)). 
 
54 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality 
Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (2003). 
 
55 See Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 
VA. L. REV. 723, 727 (1989) (“The particular items of information mandated to be disclosed [under SEC 
rules] are presumably automatically deemed to be ‘material’.”).  Thousands of examples of prescribed 
items can be cited, including the specific requirements found in (a) Item 11 to Form S-1 concerning the 
required prospectus for offering securities, (b) Items 1-8 to Form 8-K stating events that require filing a 
current report and (c) the content of both quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and annual reports on Form 10-K. 
 
56  Exchange Act, §13(d); 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1 (2006); see Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 
58 (1971) (emphasizing purpose of rule to provide shareholders with information about the bidder and 
incumbent management to provide additional information of its own without any intention to aid 
management in resisting a bid by tipping the balance of power between bidders and managers). 
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 First, interaction between individual rules and principles within a larger system 
constrains abuse of power, by both those subject to the provisions and those who enforce 
them.  Risk of power abuse arises from principles without rules or from rules without 
principles.    
 
 Imagine a principles-only system, such as one stating only that public companies 
must “disclose all material facts” (period) or that their financial statements must “be 
fairly presented” (period).  How do managers determine what to do in a given 
circumstance?  Who decides whether companies have complied with the principles?  
How will an enforcer make the case that a violation occurred or a manager defend against 
the charge?  Vague concepts such as materiality and fairness unaccompanied by some 
specific content create risks of both ad hoc managerial decision-making and arbitrary 
enforcement.  Some specificity reflecting rule-like characteristics is necessary to give 
meaning to such principles.  Alone, they are vulnerable to abuse.  
 
 Conversely, imagine a rules-only system, such as a specific schedule of required 
items of disclosure listed from A to Z or triggered by events one through ten.  Absent 
accompanying principles, rule-makers operate by fiat.  Managers need not think or 
exercise judgment, even when following those rules produces absurd results.  Some may 
even exploit the rules as blueprints to achieve such absurd results.  Principles are 
necessary to mediate the rules. 
 
 Second, the co-existence of rules and principles within a system helps to assess its 
coherence.  The concept of materiality in securities regulation might be expected to mean 
the same thing in different contexts; if it does not, an explanation for the difference is 
required.57  If variations cannot be convincingly explained, then either the rules are not 
based on principles or they are based on the wrong principles.58  For example, Section 
13(d), which requires 5% owners to disclose their position and intent concerning control, 
should bear some logical relation to the concept of materiality.  Thus, the rule is coherent 
if it requires disclosure of information that “reasonable investors would consider 
important in making an investment decision.” 
 
 Third, the interaction among rules and principles reduces anxiety over whether an 
individual provision should initially be formed as a rule or a principle.  The issue is how 
much the form of articulation controls its application and interaction with other 
provisions so that outcomes vary in otherwise equivalent circumstances.  Perhaps there is 
some control, but with dynamic interaction, convergence occurs to limit its effect.  As an 
extreme example, with separation of governmental powers, legislatures may create laws 
residing toward either end of the rules-principles spectrum.  When legislatures choose 
rules, judges often relax and thus transform them into laws exhibiting principles-like 
features; when legislatures enact principles, judges can tighten them into laws with rule-
                                                 
57 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 
58 See Christopher W. Nobes, Rules-Based Standards and the Lack of Principles in Accounting, 19 ACCT.  
HORIZONS 25 (2005). 
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like features.59   This observation does not mean that the initial legislative choice is 
inconsequential; it may be of considerable significance in given cases.  However, it also 
suggests that the choice is not final so that the form does not control the application.   
 
 This observation also contributes perspective on any systemic preference for 
expressing individual provisions as rules or principles.  The dynamic interaction of 
individual rules and principles within larger systems suggests caution about designing a 
legal or accounting system that presumptively privileges rules or principles.  If any 
presumption were warranted at an abstract level, it would suggest having a combination 
of rules and principles to maximize the benefits of the interaction among them.  But even 
that presumption risks overlooking important trade-offs associated with formulating 
individual provisions and ignoring the dynamics of their application and interaction 
within the larger system. 
 
II.  A SURVEY OF THE SYSTEMS 
 
 While the preceding discussion suggests conceptual difficulties in imagining how 
any legal or accounting system can be either rules-based or principles-based, the 
following discussion surveys actual and proposed systems of corporate law, securities 
regulation and accounting.  It attempts to provide, for each system, both an inventory of 
individual provisions and a sense of how the provisions are applied and how they 
interact.  The examination justifies more skepticism that any of these systems may fairly 
be described using such labels.   
 
A.  Existing Systems 
 
 A canvas of the major topics appearing on the syllabus in corporations and 
securities regulation, and some of the commonly cited topics in accounting, suggests that 
misconceptions exist about how they may be classified as rules-based or principles-based. 
At minimum, common conceptions are overstated.   
 
 1.  Corporate Law — Scholars commonly describe corporate law, especially 
Delaware corporate law, as principles-based,60 although some see a more rules-like 
                                                 
59 See Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, supra note ___, at 321-325; infra text 
accompanying notes ___-___ (example of the relationship between §102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law authorizing director-liability exculpation and the judicial doctrine of good faith that 
amplifies an exception to that authorization). 
 
60 See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1205, 1236 (2001) (“Delaware’s corporate law tends to rely on standard-based tests [meaning] that 
the relation between a certain set of facts and the outcome of a legal dispute is determined ex post rather 
than ex ante”); Curtis Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2212 (2005) (“The major features of Delaware corporate law [include] the 
prevalence of broad standards over detailed rules”); Ehud Kamar, A Jurisdictional competition Theory of 
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1914-1915 (1998) (“Delaware [corporate] law 
is at one end of this continuum.  It relies extensively on broad legal standards”). 
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quality among the principles.61  As the following discussion shows, both are credible 
positions, meaning that neither is clearly correct.  Corporate law is a mixture of rules and 
principles whose application and interaction generates a rich complex tapestry that 
diminishes the utility of any such tidy classifications.   
 
 Before deeply examining corporate law, note first that inquiry concerning rules 
versus principles in corporate law is distinct from the debate in corporate law scholarship 
concerning whether the law is or should be more mandatory or enabling.62  Corporate law 
doctrines array along a rules-principles continuum whether they are required by law or 
optional.  Take cumulative voting.  Most state statutes authorize but do not require using 
this voting method.63  Even so, the law of cumulative voting is best located at the rules 
end of the range, for it denotes a specific mathematical formula for casting and counting 
votes in director elections.  In the minority of states that require cumulative voting, 
disputes concerning its use may be resolved by applying principles-like tools such as 
fiduciary duty.64
 
 At the rules end of the corporate law spectrum are provisions that establish a 
hierarchy of sources of legal authority.  This hierarchy puts state corporation law statutes 
at the top, followed by articles of incorporation (the charter), then by-laws and then 
contracts (with judicial decisions hovering throughout).  So statutes may authorize 
corporations to adopt tailored provisions suiting particular goals, but then require that any 
tailored provision appear in the charter or in the by-laws.65  Courts treat as a dead letter 
                                                 
61 Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate 
Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1133-1134 (2004) (“Delaware law of fiduciary 
duties is itself more rule-like and predictable than many standards, having been fleshed out by an extensive 
body of case law precedent that reflects a consistent underlying norm of shareholder primacy”); compare 
Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (“Delaware’s corporate law rules are standards based”) (emphasis added); Edward 
B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1104 
(1997) (criticizing “a persistent tendency to acknowledge that Delaware corporate law largely involves 
standards, but then to try to reduce it to a set of rules”). 
 
62  See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial 
Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989) (distinguishing debate over contractual freedom from inquiry into 
how judges should approach gaps in corporate arrangements); Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of 
the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 985 (1993). 
 
63 Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 214; Model Act § 7.28. 
 
64 See, e.g., Humphrys v. Winous Co., 133 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio 1956). 
 
65 E.g., Model Act §§ 7.27 (action by shareholders); 7.28 (election of directors); 8.24 (action by directors). 
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provisions placed in the wrong document.66  When the charter and by-laws contain 
conflicting provisions, a corporate law rule provides that the charter controls.67   
 
 Rules delineate the distribution of power in corporate life.  The basic rule relating 
to shareholder power is a simple negative injunction: shareholders have no general power 
over management of a corporation.68  Corporation statutes provide that boards have this 
power.  Statutes grant shareholders power in specific situations, usually director 
elections, charter amendments, certain business combinations and dissolutions.69  Even in 
specific cases where shareholders have power, they usually lack authority to initiate 
action but may only consent to (or withhold consent from) board-made proposals.70
 
 Rules require that shareholders elect directors.71  Rules granting managerial power 
to boards are accompanied by additional rules regulating board conduct.  Directors have 
no power to act individually, but only to bind the corporation when acting together as a 
board.  Both statutory rules and judicial applications impose stringent formalities for 
board action.  For example, the statutes contain rules requiring notice and quorums and 
also authorize action by written consent in lieu of meetings but only if unanimous and 
using teleconference connections but only if specified requirements are met.72
 
 Why all these rules?  They provide a baseline ordering mechanism necessary to 
create the formal creature law calls the corporation; they also begin to shape the balance 
of power among its participants.73  Principles come into play and mediate these rules, 
provide rationales, and interact with them to alter the system’s overall character.  Thus 
while the hierarchy of corporate law sources contributes apparent rule-like certainty, it is 
possible to persuade a court to enforce, as a contract, a provision placed in a by-law when 
                                                 
66 See Roach v. Bynum, 437 So.2d 69 (Ala. 1983) (super-majority shareholder quorum and voting provision 
required to appear in charter appeared in by-law and so was unenforceable); Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza 
Securities Co., 496 A.2d 1031 (Del. 1985) (director-approved by-law amendment limiting shareholder 
action by written consent unenforceable because it conflicted with Delaware Code §228(b) which requires 
any limitations on this grant of authority to appear in the charter). 
 
67 See Paulek v. Isgar, 551 P.2d 213 (Colo. App. 1976); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112 
(1945). 
 
68 See Model Act § 8.01; Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 141(a); Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11 (1867). 
 
69 E.g., Model Act §§ 8.03 & 8.05 (election of directors), §§ 10.03 & 10.04 (amendment of articles of 
incorporation), § 11.03 (statutory mergers) and §§ 14.02 & 14.03 (voluntary dissolution).    
 
70 See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003).  
 
71 Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 211(b). 
 
72 E.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 141(f) & Model Act § 8.21 (action by unanimous written consent in lieu of a 
meeting); Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 141(i) (board meetings using teleconference connections). 
 
73 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1593 
(1989) (noting power allocation function of such mandatory terms in corporate law). 
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a statute directs it to appear in the charter.74  Rules granting managerial power to boards 
and episodic consenting power to shareholders are relaxed considerably into a principles-
like framework for closely-held corporations, a context in which many traditional rules of 
corporate law similarly relax into principles.75  
 
 Toward the rules end of the corporate law spectrum are provisions governing the 
forms of business combinations and divestitures.  Corporate law offers a menu of 
alternative forms, including statutory merger, asset sales and stock sales.76  This enables 
transaction engineers to structure deals that, while having identical substantive effects, 
may or may not require a shareholder vote or carry appraisal rights.77  Courts respect 
formal rules, invoking such further rules as the doctrine of independent legal significance 
(in effect, a denial of the so-called de facto merger doctrine).78  To protect against hostile 
takeover bids, moreover, statutes offer rule-bound anti-takeover provisions.79
 
 Rules also enable designing transactions to achieve identical substantive results 
using subsidiary corporations that likewise avoid shareholder votes or appraisal rights.  
Courts similarly defer to these structural maneuvers, projecting a rigid rule-like quality to 
these laws.80  They respect statutory distinctions between redemptions and mergers, even 
when transactional alternatives present identical substantive consequences to 
shareholders.81  The same rule-bound results follow in relation to third parties.  
Transactions structured as mergers mean that all assets and liabilities of the constituent 
corporations combine “by operation of law” with immutable implications for third-party 
consents82 whereas in asset or stock acquisitions they transfer by operation of contract 
with changeable implications for third-party consents.83  
                                                 
74 See Jones v. Wallace, 628 P.2d 388 (Or.  1981). 
 
75 See, e.g., Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980) (enforcing agreement despite noncompliance with 
statutory provisions); Triggs v. Triggs, 385 N.E.2d 1254 (N.Y. 1978) (same); see also Larry E. Ribstein & 
Burce Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 85 & 89 
(2001). 
 
76 Del. Gen. Corp. L. §§ 241 (redemptions), 251 (mergers), 271 (asset sales); see also Model Act, § 11.03 
(share exchange). 
 
77 See Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemical, 150 A.2d 755 (Del. 1959); Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 
123 (Del. 1963). 
 
78 See D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture 
Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825 (2004). 
 
79  E.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 203 (specific rules lay out ex ante instructions using extensive definition, of 
terms such as interested stockholder, and bright-lines, such as 90-day and 3-year periods and 66.66% 
voting and 85% ownership thresholds). 
 
80 See, e.g., Equity Group Holdings v. DMG, 576 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (applying Florida law). 
 
81 See, e.g., Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying Delaware law). 
 
82 See PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 930 (1979). 
 
83 See Branmar Theatre v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526 (Del. Ch. 1970). 
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 Why these rules?  As with the rules and principles establishing and mediating the 
hierarchy of sources in corporate law, these rules prescribe mechanical devices to govern 
a corporation’s life; they also allocate power among participants.  How are they 
mediated?  As to respecting forms of corporate combinations, the de facto merger 
doctrine sometimes prevails for shareholders and more often succeeds when advanced by 
other constituencies to challenge formal transaction structures.  Thus, non-shareholder 
claimants increasingly succeed in invoking the de facto merger doctrine when asserting 
claims in tort, labor and environmental law.84  
 
 The statutory law of appraisal rights is intensely rule-bound, especially in 
Delaware.  There, appraisal provisions are a detailed labyrinth of rules that first grant 
rights, then deny those rights, and then restore some of those rights, depending on stated 
formal attributes of a transaction.85  Yet courts awarding the appraisal remedy face 
numerous questions whose resolution requires applying vague concepts.  These involve 
such matters as whether the appraisal remedy is exclusive or may be conjoined with other 
claims,86 the applicable valuation method,87 and identification of the business to be 
valued.88  Resulting appraisal remedy doctrine can be described as rules-based or 
principles-based because, in fact, it is a mixture—but neither is a particularly faithful 
description. 
 
 Toward the principles end of the continuum in corporate law are the laws of 
fiduciary duty, mainly the duties of care and loyalty.  It is possible to understand much of 
Delaware corporate fiduciary duty law as hortatory sermonizing.89  Many characterize 
Delaware fiduciary duty law as indeterminate, putting it squarely on the principles 
(vague) end of any continuum.90  That location is unsurprising when one considers that 
Delaware courts conceive of themselves as courts in equity (a designation still formally 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
84 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320 (7th Cir. 1996) (personal injuries); Fall River Dyeing & 
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) (labor); North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642 
(7th Cir. 1998) (environmental). 
 
85 Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 262. 
 
86 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 
A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985); Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (2001). 
 
87 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 
88 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (whether the business to be valued is solely 
the business as it existed absent the transaction or taking account of value that arises in the first-stage of a 
two-step acquisition). 
 
89 See Rock, Saints and Sinners, supra note ___. 
 
90 See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law 
Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 53 n. 221 (2005) (citing and summarizing more than a dozen articles 
offering competing assessments of the virtues of such indeterminacy in Delaware corporate fiduciary duty 
law). 
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retained by its Court of Chancery).91  Even when statutorily codified, as in the Model 
Business Corporation Act (the Model Act), the duty of care bears a vague general quality 
typically associated with principles.92
 
 Still, fiduciary duty cases addressing designated doctrinal subjects can be 
synthesized into recognizable rules.93  In mundane cases of ordinary business decisions 
or activity, the business judgment rule presumes that directors met their duty of care.  The 
few cases exposing directors to liability for breaching the duty of care in ordinary 
contexts address egregious behavior, as when directors are inebriated, ill-informed or 
commit illegal acts.94  A rule emerges that directors are liable for breach of the duty of 
care in ordinary settings only when drunk, ignorant or criminal.  Corporations also can 
opt for a statute-authorized rule against personal director financial liability for breaching 
the duty of care,95 a license created immediately after the Delaware Supreme Court held 
ill-informed directors liable for breaching the duty.96
 
 That license assumes the form of a rule: it concretely and prospectively authorizes 
exculpation.  The rule has a limit.  Exculpation does not extend to liability arising from 
“acts or omissions not in good faith.”97  The vast majority of Delaware corporations took 
advantage of the rule. That, in turn, contributed to increasing judicial invocation of a 
principle of good faith.98  Resulting judicial opinions are complex and so difficult to 
reconcile that they provide little advance direction.99 The result is a vagueness 
                                                 
91 See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law after QVC and 
Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593 (1994); Lyman P.Q. 
Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1149, 1193-94 (2004). 
 
92 See Model Act § 8.30; D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate Director Standards from the Model 
Business Corporation Act, 68 CIN. L. REV. 1201 (1999). 
 
93 See Paredes, A Systems Approach, supra note ___, at 1133-34; see also Rock, Saints and Sinners, supra 
note ___, at 1104 (noting and criticizing tendency of scholars to pursue this route). 
 
94 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 
1985); Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (applying New York law); see also In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (opinion approving settlement elaborating, in dicta, on 
duty of care’s bearing on maintaining a system of internal control). 
 
95 Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7).   
 
96 Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael 
Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006). 
 
97 Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7).  The limitation also excludes liability arising from breaches of the duty of 
loyalty, unlawful distributions, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of law and deriving improper 
personal benefits.  Id.  
 
98 See Hillary Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006). 
 
99 See Matthew R. Berry, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless Directors From Personal 
Liability? Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (2004); John L. Reed & 
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characteristic of principles.  This development illustrates not only how rules and 
principles interact but also how a relatively tight statutory rule enables its judicial 
transformation into a much more open-ended principle.100
 
  The ultimate principle in corporate law is the duty of loyalty.101  This forbids 
corporate officers and directors to act contrary to the interests of their beneficiary, 
traditionally meaning the corporation and its shareholders.  When personal and corporate 
interests conflict, the official must subordinate her interests to those of the corporation 
and its shareholders.   These abstract principles are mediated in many states by statutory 
safe-harbor rules delineating processes that officials can follow to protect their decisions 
from judicial rebuke in such “self-interested” transactions—usually approval by a 
majority of disinterested and fully-informed directors or shareholders.102  
 
 Although written as rules, the linguistic character of such statutes requires 
interpretation that judges perform to mediate between the principle of loyalty and the 
rules of process that the statutes articulate.  From the interaction, cases produce results 
with varying degrees of vagueness (blending attributes of rules and principles).  Thus, 
even though the duty of loyalty is equity-like, it still carries hints of rule-ness.  This 
quality manifests in the tests that Delaware courts use to evaluate breaches of the duty in 
contexts in addition to self-interested transactions, especially the entire fairness test in 
cash-out mergers and the heightened scrutiny applied in takeover contexts.103
 
 In cash-out mergers, judges endorse using an independent committee to mimic an 
arms’-length transaction measured by fair value.104  In takeovers, courts particularize 
abstract fiduciary duty to require boards to auction a company to the highest bidder if a 
sale is to be effected;105 if a transaction does not amount to a sale, then associated 
                                                                                                                                                 
Matt Neiderman, Good Faith and the Ability of Directors to Assert §102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of 
Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2004); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in 
Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2004). 
 
100 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
101 E.g., Schnell v. Christ-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (“inequitable action does not 
become permissible simply because it is legally possible”). 
 
102 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 144; Model Act §§ 8.60-8.63. 
 
103 See Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 
J. CORP. L. 583 (1994) (offering coherent account of Delaware takeover cases despite much criticism of 
them as incoherent); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover 
Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103 (2003) (offering coherent account of the cases using the theory of the firm). 
 
104  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 
(Del. Ch. 1988); see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 434-
36 (1993) (discussing process-oriented concept of fairness in corporate law). 
 
105 See Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, 678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1996); Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC 
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 
(Del. 1986); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (1989). 
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defensive tactics must survive a reasonableness test.106  In both contexts, courts review 
whether directors were independent and followed a sufficient process to benefit 
shareholders, blending rules and principles.107  
 
 If corporate law contains both rules and principles that are applied and interact in 
these classification-defying ways, does it matter whether an articulation originates as a 
rule or as a principle?  Two examples suggest that it matters little.  First, laws governing 
shareholder distributions can be stated either way.  Traditional statutes, such as 
Delaware’s, are detailed rules that apply concepts of par value and legal capital;108 
modern statutes, like the Model Act, use general principles, forbidding distributions if 
making them would prevent the corporation from paying its debts when due or reduce its 
assets below liabilities (measured using any methods that are reasonable in the 
circumstances).109  Courts apply the traditional statutes liberally, allowing boards to 
measure statutory terms (such as assets and liabilities) according to reasonable valuations 
they choose.110  Perhaps it matters whether one or the other is the starting point, but this 
evidence suggests that it matters only slightly.111
 
 Second, a similar lawmaking option characterizes corporate law governing asset 
sales.  Traditional statutes require shareholder consent when a corporation’s board 
proposes to sell “all or substantially all” the corporation’s assets.112  Innovative statutes 
attempt greater specification by requiring a shareholder vote only if the transaction leaves 
the corporation “without a significant continuing business activity.”113  Comparing the 
provisions, the traditional one is relatively more principles-like and the innovative one 
slightly more rule-like (a pure rule formulation would define the threshold numerically, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
106 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Paramount Communications, Inc. 
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).  
 
107 Emphasis on the process-oriented rules produces concern that directors and advisors use mindless 
checklists to meet the expected requirements.  See Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of 
Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589, 589 (2006) (“tracing the waning of the duty of care: a rule that now requires 
little more of a director than a ritualistic consideration of relevant data”); infra Part III.A. 
 
108 Del. Gen. Corp. L. §§ 154, 160, 170, 171, 173, 244. 
 
109 Model Act, §§ 6.21 & 6.40.  
 
110 See Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 702 A.2d 150 (Del. 1997); Randall v. Bailey, 23 
N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1940); Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying New York 
law). 
 
111  See BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL (3d ed. 1990); Craig A. Peterson & 
Norman W. Hawker, Does Corporate Law Matter? Legal Capital Restrictions on Stock Distributions, 31 
AKRON L. REV. 175 (1997) (empirical study showing that the forms may matter some for purposes of 
signaling information to shareholders in the market even if they do not matter much in respect of creditor 
protection).  
 
112 E.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 271. 
 
113 See Model Act § 12.02(a). 
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and no US corporate law statute does so).  Yet the alternative statutes lead to the same 
result.114  
 
 This survey spans much of the corporate law syllabus.  A full examination would 
confirm that rules and principles dot the landscape in blended measure, with applications 
and interactions that influence and reshape systemic characteristics.  Rule-like provisions 
address corporate formation, preemptive rights, director removal and shareholder 
oppression and deadlock; principle-like provisions mediate each of these.  Principles-like 
provisions also appear in the corporate opportunity doctrine, where case law also enables 
synthesized statements bearing rule-like character;115 limited liability is a rule subject to 
exceptions based on public regarding principles;116 and corporate dispute administration 
is replete with yet another set of principles and rules, addressing matters such as 
indemnification, special litigation committees and statutes of limitation.117  But these 
illustrations should suffice to question the possibility of tidy classification of corporate 
law as rules-based or principles-based (in Delaware or other states). 
 
 2.  Securities Regulation — Many scholars (and judges) nevertheless promote 
Delaware corporate law as principles-based, especially when contrasting this with US 
federal securities regulation, which is alleged to be rules-based.118  Others believe that the 
purpose of the asserted rules-density of federal securities regulation is to offset the 
                                                 
114 See Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 386, n. 79 (Del. Ch. 2004) (emphasizing 
comparability of Delaware’s § 271 with the Model Act’s § 12.02(a) despite how they “differ verbally”), 
aff’d 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005). 
 
115 See Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 725 A.2d 1018 (Me. 1999) (drawing on synthesis of the 
corporate opportunity doctrine as codified by the American Law Institute as a way to provide clarity to this 
“murky area”); see also Harvey Gelb, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: Recent Cases and the Elusive 
Goal of Clarity, 31 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 371 (surveying various state tests in corporate opportunity 
doctrine, including factors of corporate capacity and information disclosure, showing both broad principles 
and specific rules at work); Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the 
Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 279, 208 (1998) (succinctly stating the doctrine in a 
simple algorithm bearing a rule-like quality and expressing regret that “this doctrinal algorithm has proven 
unwieldy in application”). 
 
116 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 
(1991). 
 
117 See Matthew G. Dore, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search for Middle 
Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 695, 720-736 (1997). 
 
118 E.g., Griffith & Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism, supra note ___, at 20-23 (contrasting Delaware 
corporate law’s “supple,” “flexible,” “subtle” and “responsive” corporate law to federal securities 
regulation which involves “issuing mandates,” “governance directives,” and “orders”); Kamar, 
Jurisdictional competition Theory of Indeterminacy, supra note ___, at 1921 (“It is instructive . . .  to 
compare Delaware law with federal securities law, which [is] rule-based”); Faith Stevelman Kahn, 
Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 512-513 
(2000) (flexible corporate law is more effective than “comparatively rigid, rules-based systems . . . such as 
the securities laws”). 
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deficiencies of state corporation law’s alleged penchant for principles.119  US securities 
regulation also often is decried as being rules-based in contrast to other nations’ securities 
regulations, especially Canada’s, which are described as principles-based.120  The 
following survey of US securities regulation supports none of these characterizations.   
 
 At the rules end of the securities regulation continuum are the vast majority of 
laws governing securities offerings.  Entities, transactions and securities must be 
registered and prescribed prospectuses prepared and circulated.  As with much of the 
structure of US federal securities regulation across all contexts, such provisions are 
subject to exemptions and exceptions to the exemptions and are protected by safe 
harbors.  Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 Act requires registration unless an 
exemption exists.121  Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act provide exemptions and SEC 
regulations provide safe harbors, all of which contain precisely delineated 
boundaries122—although some also use vague provisions such as a condition of good 
faith123 or depend on open-textured concepts such as whether an offering is “public” or 
“private.”124
 
 Toward the rules end of the securities regulation continuum are many laws 
governing securities firms.  While mostly rule-like, they are tinged with an overlaying 
texture best described as principle-like.  Examples of broker-dealer rules are: net capital 
                                                 
119 See Mark J. Roe, Institutional Foundations for Securities Markets in the West (2002) (on file with the 
author and available at http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/frydmanr/Roe-AER2003.doc). 
 
120 E.g., Kuras, supra note ___ (Canadian versus US); Robert Wright, Enron: The Ambitious and the 
Greedy, 16 WINDSOR REV. LEG. & SOC. ISSUES 71, 73 (2003) (Canadian versus US). 
 
121 Securities Act, §5(a)(1) (making it unlawful to use interstate commerce to sell a security unless a 
registration statement is effective); 5(a)(2) (forbidding using interstate commerce to carry an unregistered 
security for purposes of selling or delivering it); 5(a)(3) (prohibiting offering to buy or sell a security before 
a registration statement has been filed for it).  Similarly, the Exchange Act exempts government and 
municipal securities and numerous others.  See Exchange Act, §3(a)(12) (defining “exempted security” for 
purposes of otherwise required registration under Exchange Act §12(b)). 
 
122 Exempted classes of securities under the Securities Act include for self-employed benefit plans, 
commercial paper, charitable and other nonprofit issuers, insurance, compensatory benefit plans and small 
issues.  Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3(a)(2)-(4), (8); Rule 701; Regulations A & D. Exempted transactions 
include exchanges with existing shareholders, intrastate issues, private offerings and transactions by dealers 
and brokers.  Id., §§ 3(a)(9), 3(a)(11), 4(1)-(4); Rules 144 & 144A.  As to safe harbors, see, e.g., Securities 
Act Rule 135 (addressing §5(c) liability); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 
574 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc) (emphasizing rule-like character of the safe harbor, which it refers to as based 
on a “checklist of features” that provides guidance superior to any “judicially formulated ‘rule of reason’”); 
§10 (allowing tombstone advertisements). 
 
123 17 C.F.R. 231.646 (eligibility for §3(a)(9)’s exemption for exchanges with existing shareholders must 
involve an exchange made in good faith and not one intended simply to evade the statute’s requirements). 
 
124 See, e.g., SEC Rel. No. 33-4552, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶¶ 2771-72 & 2275-76 (1962) (factors applied to 
determine whether the private offering exemption is available include the identity, number and 
sophistication of the offerees and size and manner of offer); 17 C.F.R. 231.285 (same). 
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rules,125 credit extension rules,126 short-sale rules,127 trading practices rules,128 customer 
confirmation rules,129 and rules governing contingency offerings.130  These rules are 
supplemented by broad anti-fraud principles of general applicability131 and tailored to the 
broker-dealer context by prohibitions on misappropriating customer funds or securities, 
unsuitable or unauthorized trading, churning, and charging excessive markups.132    
 
 Why these rules (as supplemented by the principles)?  As with corporate laws 
governing the hierarchy of sources of legal authority and addressing business 
combinations and divestitures, securities regulations stating filing requirements and firm 
conduct provide a baseline.  They establish requirements that are fundamental to the 
existence of a regulated disclosure system and securities industry.  True, these laws are 
not inevitable—the free market could be left to its own devices—but once a decision to 
regulate is made, it is not surprising that the attributes of the regulatory system at this 
basic level should be rule-like.   
 
 Nor is it surprising that such rules are mediated by associated principles.  In fact, 
all broker-dealer regulations ultimately derive from principles that predate US federal 
securities acts as epitomized by the traditional “shingle theory” of securities 
professionals.133  For example, the duty to obtain best execution for customer 
transactions is rooted in common law agency principles.134  Other general principles that 
flow from these traditional concepts include the imposition of duties on firms to 
supervise employees.135  Additional examples of principles include those that the SEC 
                                                 
125 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (including specifying methods of computing net capital). 
 
126 See, e.g., Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. 220.1 to 220.132. 
 
127 17 C.F.R. 240.10a-1. 
 
128 See Reg. M, 62 Fed. Reg. 520 (codified at 17 C.F.R. 242); Rules 101, 102, 62 Fed. Reg.  520, 546-548 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. 242.1-10243.102). 
 
129 Exchange Act Rule 10b-10. 
 
130  17 C.F.R. 240.10b-9, 240.15c2-4. 
 
131 See Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; Securities Act § 17(a), 
15 U.S.C. 77(1). 
 
132 Exchange Act, Rules 15c1-2, 15c2-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.15c1-2, 240.15c2-2. 
 
133 See Kahn v. SEC, 291 F.2d 112, 115 (2nd Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring); Roberta Karmel, Is the 
Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271 (1995) (explaining the concept as constituting an 
implied representation of fair dealing based upon holding oneself out to the public as a broker or dealer). 
 
134 SEC Rel. No. 34-37619A (1996), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 85,837 (CCH); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3rd Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
 
135 Exchange Act §15(b)(4)(E); see Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Broker-Dealer Supervision: 
A Troublesome Area, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 527 (1994); John H. Walsh, Right the First Time: 
Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
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has invoked to contest the inappropriate influence by investment bankers over research 
analysts136 and the allocation of IPO shares to favored customers in exchange for inflated 
commissions or markdowns.137    
 
 Disclosure laws include both rules and principles.  Laws governing the timing of 
filing disclosure documents are rule-like (including Section 13(d)’s requirement of 
disclosure at the 5% ownership level).  General laws qualified by concepts of materiality 
are thoroughly and consciously principles-like.138  The SEC’s requirement that disclosure 
be written in “plain-English” is a principle, although it also contains specific rule-like 
components such as a prohibition against using “multiple negatives.”139  Disclosure 
concerning financial matters may bear attributes of rules or principles according to the 
qualities of the related accounting provisions.  The SEC offers a typology and illustrates 
the categories by characterizing certain accounting provisions as rules and others 
principles.140
 
 Toward the principles end of the securities regulation spectrum, US insider 
trading laws prohibit trading while in possession of material non-public information 
when occupying some capacity of trust or other special relationship.141  As applied to 
corporate officers and directors, these laws derive from state fiduciary duty principles and 
become a federal violation when coupled to the anti-fraud provisions of federal securities 
statutes, which state broad principles.142  The SEC accelerated the development of these 
                                                                                                                                                 
165; In re Prudential Bache Securities, Rel. No. 34-22755, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 83,948 (1986); In re Matter of 
Prudential Securities, Inc., SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 48149 (2003). 
 
136 See Analyst Research Global Settlement, SEC (Dec. 20, 2002). 
 
137 See SEC v. Parnes, Litig. Rel. No. 16877 (Jan. 31, 2001) (proceedings concerning Datek Securities). 
 
138 Congress, the SEC and courts have emphatically eschewed providing any bright-line content to the 
concept of materiality.  See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (rejecting agreement-in-
principle test to trigger materiality of preliminary merger negotiations and stating that “A bright-line rule 
indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the 
circumstances.  But ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the securities 
acts and Congress’ policy decisions.”); SEC, Reg. FD, Rel. No. 34-43154, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 86,319 (CCH) 
(2000) (“we do not believe an appropriate answer to [the difficulty of defining materiality] is to set forth a 
bright-line test, or an exclusive list of ‘material’ items”); SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (Aug. 12, 
1999) (for accounting, rejecting efforts to design rules of thumb, such as a threshold measure of 5% of 
earnings). 
 
139 SEC Rule 421(c) (all required prospectus information is to be written in clearly understandable prose); 
Rule 421(d)(2) (no multiple negatives).  
 
140 Securities and Exchange Commission, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 on the Adoption by the US Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System 
(2003) [hereinafter, “SEC, SOX 108 Study”].  The SEC’s typology is discussed in detail in the next 
Section. 
 
141 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 
142 Four classes of persons are exposed to insider trading restrictions and hence liability: classical insiders 
(based on corporate positions), temporary insiders (often professionals providing services to the 
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laws in the mid-1980s when it began a vigorous campaign using the enforcement model 
described as ad hoc—meaning weighted towards enforcing broad abstract principles 
rather than specific detailed rules.143  
 
 Despite the genesis of insider trading laws as principles, resulting applications can 
yield expressions bearing rule-like attributes.  At least in terms of their specificity and 
particularity, this famously occurs when attempting to state the law governing tipper-
tipee liability, where vagueness dissolves into a dense rule-patterned framework.144  
Based on the extent of advance notice provided, the SEC offers rule-like certainty 
concerning non-business relationships that create liability risk145 and concerning insiders 
who trade for reasons not based on their inside information.146
 
 Some laws with principles-like qualities morph into multi-factor tests.  Consider 
the law forbidding market manipulation.147  All US market manipulation laws stem, in 
turn, from Section 10(b)’s principle proscribing “manipulative or deceptive devices or 
contrivances.”  Establishing a market manipulation violation requires proving: (1) a 
misrepresentation or omission of material facts or other fraudulent device; (2) made in 
                                                                                                                                                 
corporation), tippers and tipees in the flow of information that includes such insiders and misappropriators 
who essentially steal inside information.  Ultimately, all these persons are restricted and liable based upon 
some ultimate connection to a breach of fiduciary duty.  See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 
833 (2d Cir. 1968) (classic insider), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2nd 
Cir. 1987) (temporary insider); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (tipping); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642 (1997) (misappropriation).   
 
143  See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead At the 
Next Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149, 156-157 (1990).  The foundations of this enforcement program were 
rooted in principles established two decades earlier.  See In re Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 
144 See Douglas M. Branson, Choosing the Appropriate Default Rule: Insider Trading Under State Law, 45 
ALA. L. REV. 753, 759-60 (1994) (dissecting the “complex” law of tippee liability stated in SEC v. Dirks, 
463 U.S. 646 (1983)); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory 
and the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REV. 775 
(1988). 
 
145 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-2 (2006) (Rule 10b5-2, adopted in 2000, stating three non-exclusive circumstances 
in which a person receiving confidential information owes a duty of trust or confidence that would trigger 
application of the misappropriation theory).  See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 1273 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(discussing background and scope of the SEC’s rule). 
 
146 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-1 (2006) (Rule 10b5-1 stating that insiders may trade on inside information when it 
is clear that the information is not a factor in their decision to trade, as under a pre-existing plan, contract, 
or good faith instruction).  See Alan D. Jagolinzer, Do Insiders Trade Strategically within the SEC Rule 
10b5-1 Safe Harbor? (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=541502 (providing evidence 
suggesting that insiders exploit the rule-like characteristics of this provision). 
 
147 Section 9 of the 1934 Act prohibits “manipulation of security prices.  ”Securities Act of 1933 §9(a)(2) 
(it is unlawful for any person to effect transactions “creating actual or apparent trading activity .  .  .  or 
raising or depressing [its] price .  .  .  for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by 
others”).   
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connection with the sale or purchase of securities; and (3) made with scienter.148  This 
proof requires assessing multiple factors concerning the nature, timing, and context of the 
trades.149  
 
 At the ultimate principles end of the continuum are securities laws containing 
anti-fraud and anti-abuse provisions.  The anti-fraud provisions encompass not only 
insider trading and market manipulation, but nearly every provision in federal securities 
regulation.150  As noted, various regulations authorize exemptions from registration for 
certain transactions, so long as certain rule-like attributes exist.  But these also provide 
that stated exemptions are unavailable if a transaction (or series of them) technically 
complies with the rules but otherwise is a scheme to evade the registration provisions.151  
For example, one anti-abuse principle broadly covers securities held in a form “used 
primarily to circumvent” the reporting provisions of the 1934 Act.152  Broker-dealer 
regulations include principles that expose professionals to liability for violation of the 
anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) even if they comply to the letter with the disclosure 
requirements imposed under the customer confirmation rules.153
 
 In light of the numerous rules and rule-like provisions in US securities regulation, 
it would be difficult to contend that such anti-fraud and anti-abuse provisions render the 
law principles-based rather than rules-based.  But their presence, along with principle-
like provisions of materiality, also makes it difficult to contend that the system is rules-
                                                 
148 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (“[Manipulation] refers generally to 
practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by 
artificially affecting market activity”). 
 
149 Factors include activity-related features (such as placing trades near the end of the day to exert price 
pressure and trading activity based on non-economic factors) and context-related features (such as the 
trader’s ownership concentration in the security and relative trading volume in it).  In re James T. Patten, 
SEC Initial Decisions Rel. No. 303 (Dec. 12, 2005); see also In re Vladlen “Larry” Vindman, SEC Initial 
Decisions Rel. No. 285 (May 24, 2005); In re vFinance Investments, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act 
Rel. No. 51530 (April 12, 2005) (also including failure to supervise).  Apparent motivations are relevant, 
like efforts that maintain a market price exceeding the minimum required for continued listing (such as 
$1.00 on the Nasdaq Stock Market).  In re James T. Patten, SEC Initial Decisions Rel. No. 303 (Dec. 12, 
2005).  Evidence of market manipulation tends to be inferred from detailed facts, such as evidence of 
motive, placing orders for large numbers of shares and later canceling all or part of the order before it 
cleared, and matching of purchases by one participant in a scheme with sales by another. 
 
150  See SEC Annual Report (2005), at 8 (explaining that overall enforcement program must reach across all 
areas to achieve “Effective deterrence of securities fraud”) (emphasis added).  The US federal securities 
laws contain numerous anti-fraud provisions, including §10(b) under the 1934 Act, §17(a) under the 1933 
Act, Rule 14(a)(9) governing proxy solicitations and §14(e) and Regulation 14E governing tender offers. 
 
151 17 CFR § 230 Prelim. Note 2 to Reg. S (2006) (off-shore transactions); 17 CFR § 230 Prelim. Note 6 to 
Reg. D (2006); 17 CFR § 240.144A Prelim. Note 3 (2006) (qualified institutional investor exemptions); 17 
CFR 230.147 Prelim. Note 3 (2006) (single-state transactions). 
 
152 17 CFR § 240.12g5-1(b)(3) (2006). 
 
153 See Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,835 F.2d 1031 (3rd Cir. 1987). 
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based.154  The individual provisions across the range are applied and interact in ways that 
transform the system’s overall complexion into one defying classification using the 
binary labels of rules-based or principles-based.   
 
 The foregoing discussion spanned much of the securities regulation syllabus.  
Additional securities regulations likewise combine rules and principles to address many 
other circumstances.  While too vast to canvas fully,155 one observes such a blend of 
provisions in contexts such as proxy solicitations156 and tender offers, which also contain 
additional examples of factor tests.157  Even the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which many say is 
“rules-based,”158 also can be read to exhibit an underlying basis in principles, making it 
plausibly “principles-based.”159  Notable critics of the Act as “rules-based” are 
accounting promulgators, whom the Act implicitly blamed for making US GAAP “rules-
based.”160  As the next section shows, the Act’s implicit charge that GAAP is rules-based 
also is of dubious validity. 
 
                                                 
154 Provisions concerning liability and defenses often hinge on principles too, such as scienter, knowledge, 
reasonable belief or investigation, privity, loss causation, and transaction causation.   
 
155 This discussion has not mentioned the Trust Indenture Act, the Investment Company Act, the 
Investment Advisers Act, or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  But a study of these laws and related 
regulations reveal a mixture of rules and principles that likewise defy tidy classification of the overall 
systems as rules-based or principles-based. 
 
156 Proxy solicitation provisions, contained in Regulation 14A, involve (a) principles-like matters such as 
the definition of solicitation, exemptions, and safe harbors. (b)  specific rule-like disclosure requirements 
for proxy statements, filing requirements, forms of proxy, (c) shareholder proposal provisions and grounds 
for exclusion which blend a mixture of rules and principles and (d) elaborate provisions encompassing the 
entire context in which proxy solicitations proceed, addressing the special roles of bankers, brokers and 
dealers.  
 
157 See Wellman v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating the test); Hanson Trust PLC 
v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 56-57 (2nd Cir. 1985) (reciting but rejecting the test); SEC v. Carter Hawley 
Hale Stores Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the test).  As with proxy solicitations, tender offer 
regulations encompass a full range of provisions spanning the spectrum from such principles to detailed 
rules concerning matters of filing, dissemination, disclosure, timing and other communications and 
activities occurring during the tender offer period. 
 
158 E.g., Wright, The Ambitious and the Greedy, supra note ___, at 73 (denigrating “rules-based” approach 
of Sarbanes-Oxley); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 
30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1195 (2004) (Sarbanes-Oxley “adopts a wholly novel, rules-based 
approach to corporate governance”). 
 
159 See Jeffrey Lipshaw, Sarbanes-Oxley, Jurisprudence, Game Theory, Insurance and Kant: Toward a 
Moral Theory of Good Governance, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1083 (2004); see also supra note ___ (example of 
the Act’s principles-like requirement that companies provide disclosure on a “rapid and current” basis). 
 
160 Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 61 (2003) (FASB 
board member asserting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains “detailed and prescriptive corporate 
governance at the federal level” being “markedly different from the principles-based approach that has 
historically been taken at the state level” and warning that this atmosphere will, in turn, stoke demand for 
more rules in accounting). 
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 3.  Accounting — Rhetoric holds that international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) are principles-based and US GAAP is rules-based.161  As with frequent 
descriptions of Delaware corporate law and common descriptions of US federal securities 
regulation, these characterizations are overstated.  True, for given accounting topics, US 
GAAP employs bright-line rules (often numerical thresholds) while IFRS states a 
principle (using relatively vague concepts such as substantial or control).  But both 
regimes ultimately show a combination of these attributes, preventing a conclusion that 
one is principles-based or rules-based in any meaningful sense.   
 
 Leases are a common example for which US GAAP favors rules and IFRS favors 
principles.162 In both systems, leases are divided into two classes (capital and operating) 
and receive different treatment: costs and receipts under operating leases are recognized 
when incurred and those under capital leases are allocated over multiple periods.  IFRS 
leases are capitalized when an arrangement transfers substantially all the risks and 
rewards of ownership; US GAAP leases are capitalized when one of four specific criteria 
exist, including a lease term that is 75% or more of the item’s useful life or the present 
value of lease payments is 90% or more of its fair value.   
 
 Although one may quarrel over the relative appeal of these approaches, it is a 
stretch to infer from this example—or even an assortment of kindred examples—that US 
GAAP is rules-based or IFRS is principles-based, for numerous contrary examples could 
be given.  Consider a paired example arising in the context of debates on two different 
but related accounting topics: callable debt and refinancing of debt.  Both pose a question 
of classification as short-term or long-term debt, with considerable consequences for 
important financial ratios and an enterprise’s financial condition and appearance.  Long-
term debt that is callable may better be seen as short-term debt; short-term debt to be 
refinanced on a long-term basis may better be seen as long-term debt.  How should the 
classification be made? 
 
 Short-term debt to be refinanced as long-term debt is so reclassified if the enterprise 
intends to complete a refinancing, evidenced by an agreement with specified 
characteristics.163  When this provision was adopted, a dissenter from it complained that 
its “intention” test was too open-ended (too principles-based in today’s jargon).  Callable 
debt is to be classified as short-term debt if due on demand within one year or if, because 
of debtor breach of the agreement, the creditor has the right to accelerate it (unless the 
lender has waived its acceleration right).164 When adopted, dissenters from this provision 
complained that it was too restrictive (too rules-based in today’s jargon).  They said it 
                                                 
161  See supra note ___ (citing sources). 
 
162 See, e.g., Rebecca Toppe Shortridge & Mark Myring, Defining Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 
CPA  J. (2004), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/804/essentials/p34.htm. 
 
163 FASB, SFAS No. 6, Classification of Short-Term Obligations Expected to Be Refinanced, ¶ 11.  The 
characteristics are essentially an expiration date beyond one year, limited lender cancellation rights, no 
covenants that are being breached and the lender having capacity to consummate the financing. 
 
164 FASB, SFAS No. 78, Classification of Obligations that are Callable by the Creditor, ¶ 5. 
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was a “further step to supplant judgment in financial reporting with arbitrary rules.”165  
These provisions endure in US GAAP, side-by-side.  Generalizing systemic bases from 
such individual examples is thus unlikely to produce reliable characterizations.  
 
 US GAAP on derivatives contains excruciating complexity spanning hundreds of 
pages, with detailed treatment specified depending on whether a transaction is a hedge or 
not and, if a hedge, a cash flow hedge, foreign currency hedge, or other kind.166   On the 
other hand, US GAAP is exactly as dense as IFRS, which is literally a copy of the US 
GAAP provisions (plus an additional 351 pages of implementation guidance).167  Even 
though both systems exhibit this rule-like quality, moreover, the provisions also direct 
classifying a financial instrument as a hedge based on managerial intention in using the 
instrument.168  That kind of vague test could justify describing accounting for derivative 
securities as principles-like.169
 
 A widely-misunderstood accounting provision at the heart of the Enron debacle 
may explain why so many people facilely believe that US GAAP is rules-based.  The 
provision concerns the definition of a subsidiary for purposes of preparing consolidated 
financial statements that include such entities.  US GAAP defined this as ownership of at 
least a majority of the voting shares of another entity.170  IFRS defines subsidiary for this 
purpose as control of the other entity.  The concepts get at the same point—ability to 
influence the other entity so that the parent’s financial report should reflect its investee’s 
financial position and risk.  But “majority” is a rule (it is not vague) and “control” is a 
principle (its use of factors in addition to arithmetic creates vagueness). 
 
 The confusion about Enron related the well-known provision on subsidiaries to an 
obscure provision concerning special purpose entities (SPEs).  To avoid consolidation of 
an SPE (to obtain “off-balance sheet treatment”) meant satisfying the provisions of 
consolidation accounting (a majority of the SPE’s equity held by third parties), plus 
arcane provisions applied to SPEs that required at least 3% of the SPE’s total capital 
(equity plus debt) to be equity.  This reduces associated risk to the owners by capping the 
ratio of debt-to-equity at 33:1.  It does not change the basic consolidation provision 
                                                 
165 FASB, SFAS No. 78 (dissenting opinions). 
 
166 See SFAS No. 115. 
 
167 Compare PATRICK R.  DELANEY, ET AL., WILEY GAAP (2004), at 161-204 (US GAAP) with BARRY J. 
EPSTEIN & ABBAS ALI MIRZA, WILEY IAS (2004), at 159-201 (IAS); see Nobes, Rules-Based Standards, 
supra note ___, at n. 13 (“The IAS No. 39 file at the IASB records that the project director . . . considered 
12 FASB Statements, 9 FASB Technical Bulletins, 7 APB Opinions, 19 AICPA Statements of Position, 
and 109 EITF consensuses”). 
 
168 See IAS No. 39, ¶ 9; SFAS No. 115, ¶¶ 7 & 12. 
 
169 Schipper, supra note ___ (FASB board member emphasizing that US GAAP on derivatives ultimately is 
based on a fundamental principle of managerial intent). 
 
170 A post-Enron revision expands the concept to require consolidation of so-called variable interest entities 
despite the basic rule.  FASB Interpretation No. 46, Variable Interest Entities. 
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which requires more than 50% of the equity to be held by third parties.  Yet many 
commentators suggested that SPEs could be excluded so long as a mere 3% of their total 
equity was held by third parties.171  That would vitiate the basic consolidation provision 
and it is not the case.172  It is absurd to allege that such a rule is to blame for the Enron 
debacle; it is also misleading to argue that it illustrates that US GAAP is rules-based.173
 
 A common example of principles in accounting, under both US GAAP and IFRS, 
concerns loss contingencies.  Liabilities for contingent events and circumstances must be 
recognized or disclosed but uncertainty makes it difficult to prescribe associated rules ex 
ante.   So accounting relies on principles of probability and magnitude.174  Even so, in 
application, participants seek to specify the meaning of probability and magnitude by 
descriptions such as “more likely than not” or assigning numerical measures 
benchmarked using other accounting concepts, such as materiality.   
 
 At the ultimate principles-end of the continuum, in both US GAAP and IFRS, are 
a series of broad general accounting precepts.  Both systems require a fair presentation 
and emphasize substance-over-form.  US GAAP also is based on an overarching concept 
                                                 
171 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate 
Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 329, 337 (2003) 
(“Enron would create an SPE and ‘buy’ 97 percent of the equity in the entity in exchange for giving the 
entity some illiquid asset of highly uncertain value that Enron wanted to clear off its balance sheet. For 
SEC/GAAP purposes, this arrangement would permit Enron to move the asset off its balance sheet and 
even show a profit on its sale, so long as 3 percent of the equity in the SPE was owned by independent, 
outside investors.”) (citing Victor Fleischer, Enron’s Dirty Tax Secret: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop, 
94 TAX NOTES 1045 (2002)); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groputhink, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1233 at n. 4 (2003) (“Firms using SPEs are not required to consolidate these entities on 
their financial statements providing that (1) an outside investor funds at least three percent of the SPE’s 
equity (2) the transferor does not ‘control’ the SPE, and (3) the transferor gives an opinion concerning the 
‘bankruptcy remote’ status of SPE”); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle 
with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1239 (2003) (“If Enron could not find another outside investor to 
hold at least a three percent equity interest in JEDI, Enron would have to ‘consolidate’ JEDI on its balance 
sheet . . . .”). 
 
172  See Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, FASB, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and 
Consumer Prot. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Feb. 14, 2002).  Indeed, when the equity level is 
that low, 100% of it must be held by third parties.  Id.  See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Catastrophic Financial 
Failures: Enron and More, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 423, 428 (2004) (“Generally accepted accounting 
principles provided that a company doing business with an SPE may treat the SPE as an independent, 
outside entity if two conditions are met: ‘(1) an owner independent of the company must make a 
substantive equity investment of at least [three percent] of the SPE's assets, and that [three percent] must 
remain at risk throughout the transaction; and (2) the independent owner must exercise control of the 
SPE’”) (citing William C. Powers, Jr. et al., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee 
of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 4 (Feb. 1, 2002)); Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing 
the Fraud-Free Zone on Errant Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 447, 454-455 (“First, it could not be 
controlled directly or indirectly by Enron. Second, an equity investor, also independent of Enron, must put 
at risk at least three percent of the SPE’s capital.”). 
 
173 See Peter Jeffrey, International Harmonization of Accounting Standards, and the Question of Off-
Balance Sheet Treatment, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 341 (2002). 
 
174 SFAS No. 5. 
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of decision usefulness.175  Both systems are imbued with conventions of aspirational 
qualities, including prudence and conservatism.  All these may be denominated as 
principles.  And the preceding illustrations—rules, principles and a mix—interact with 
these principles: all are simultaneously subject to the principles and influence their 
meaning. 
 
 The broad principles animating US GAAP lead a minority to claim that US 
GAAP is principles-based.176  The principles are stated in a conceptual framework called 
Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFACs).  Promulgators use these as a 
guide when adopting accounting provisions for specific subjects.  While not formally part 
of GAAP, the SFACs provide its foundation.177  The most important of these are noted in 
the preceding paragraph (to provide a fair presentation and substance-over-form); they 
also include that financial statements should be both relevant and reliable.178
 
 The case that US GAAP is “principles-based” is just as plausible as the more 
common claim that it is “rules-based.”  Neither is clearly correct.  For example, an SEC 
study classified US GAAP’s elements as rules-based,179 principles-based180 and 
principles-only181 (and left some unclassified, including contingencies), thus finding a 
mix.  True, many US GAAP provisions exhibit a rule-like quality compared to IFRS—
like leases and subsidiaries.  But there is also a mixture in IFRS, which also contains 
many rules, such as those pertaining to derivative securities.182  
 
 A further consideration in assessing the character of any accounting system 
concerns the scope of discretion reposed in targeted actors.   Both US GAAP and IFRS 
offer numerous alternative approaches to accounting for a single transaction in many 
contexts.  Choices exist in mundane settings such as inventory and depreciation and in 
more advanced subjects such as employee benefit plans and amortization of debt.  While 
difficult to measure which system offers more choices, it is well-known that the political 
process of approving IFRS entails contending viewpoints and a supermajority approval 
                                                 
175 Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance, supra note ___. 
 
176 Schipper, supra note ___; see William W. Bratton, Jr., Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. 
L. REV. 1023, 1043-44 (2003). 
 
177 See Schipper, supra note ___. 
 
178 Numerous other core principles can be identified.  See Bratton, Rules Versus Principles, supra note ___, 
at ___.   
 
179 SEC, SOX 108 Study, supra note ___ (“rules-based” provisions address: real estate sales, receivables 
transfers, investments, derivatives, leases, pensions, retiree benefits, stock options, and income taxes). 
 
180 Id. (“principles-based” provisions address: foreign currency translation, interest capitalization, 
intangible assets, asset retirement obligations, long-lived asset impairment, inventory, business 
combinations and restructurings). 
 
181 Id. (giving only one example of “principles-only” provisions, historical cost of depreciable assets). 
 
182 See Nobes, Rules-Based Standards, supra note ___. 
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requirement that has led IFRS in many contexts to offer menus rather than definite 
prescriptions.183  This feature may tempt one to characterize it as principles-based. Yet 
US GAAP likewise offers extensive menus.   
 
 Consider finally the SEC’s enforcement actions in accounting.184  Areas most 
susceptible to misconduct—measured by the SEC’s enforcement action distribution—are 
among the most principles-like provisions in accounting: revenue recognition185 and 
expense recognition186 along with a sizable number of cases in the likewise principles-
rich contexts of asset impairment, inventory, business combinations and restructurings.187  
These data strongly support the conclusion that it is a mistake to say that US GAAP is 
rules-based. 
* * * 
 
 To summarize, accounting systems, like corporate law and securities regulation, 
defy tidy classification as rules-based or principles-based.  This review of selected legal 
and accounting systems supports the conclusion that it is at least imprecise to denominate 
any of the described systems as principles-based or rules-based.  This does not prove that 
it is impossible to conceive of or design any system of law as rules-based or principles-
based.  But as to these subjects, at least, doing so seems doubtful, as the following 
discussion suggests. 
 
B.  Proposed Systems 
 
 Theorists and lawmakers may consciously attempt to tilt a legal or accounting 
system in favor of one end of the rules-principles continuum or the other.  But as the 
following discussion affirms, doing so is more difficult than it may seem, at least in 
corporate law, securities regulation and accounting.   
 
 1.  Emerging Economies and Corporate Law —  Professors Black and Kraakman 
draw lessons from their experience developing corporate law for post-Soviet Russia to 
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fashion an intensely rule-rich system of corporate law.188  The theory is the desperate 
need for certainty, desperate because of its absence in the Soviet regime upon which 
Russia was forced to build its emerging economy.189  The model helps to show that even 
the most conscious effort to design a system of corporate law using rules, written from 
scratch, cannot escape including significant provisions recognizable as principles.   
 
 They refer to this as a “self-enforcing” model.  It is “self-enforcing” in that its 
elements are designed to rely minimally on administrative or judicial enforcement—
corporate participants following the provisions can enforce them internally.  This is 
important for emerging economies because they lack a legal, economic and social 
infrastructure that supports enforcement of corporate law.  The main feature of the self-
enforcing model is an emphasis on the use of bright-line rules instead of principles.190   
However, Professors Black and Kraakman recognize that their resulting model is not 
purely based on bright-line rules because, as the following summary indicates, this is 
impossible.   
 
 The self-enforcing model imposes specific mandates by statute.  Rules provide for 
supermajority shareholder voting on designated transactions.191  Shareholder consent is 
required for an asset sale involving 50% or more of the company’s book value (not the 
typical US requirement triggered by a sale of “all or substantially all” assets).192  
Shareholder takeout rights arise when a third party acquires ownership of 30% of the 
voting equity.  The model protects shareholder voting rights by a one-share, one-vote rule 
to prevent insiders from accumulating voting power disproportionate to economic stakes.  
This protection is reinforced by allowing shareholders to nominate directors or make 
other proposals.  The model also mandates disclosure, confidential voting and cumulative 
voting. 
 
 At the board level, the model requires certain features, such as audit committees.  
To protect the value of cumulative voting, the model requires minimum board size and 
prohibits staggered director terms.  A set portion of directors must be independent of the 
corporation.  These directors are entrusted with exercising specified power over 
designated extraordinary transactions, including self-interested transactions.  For self-
interested transactions, the model follows closely the process provisions found in 
contemporary US corporate law statutes—approval by fully-informed, disinterested 
directors or shareholders.193
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 While the foregoing examples show maximum use of bright-line rules, numerous 
other contexts require principles.  A good example of the need for principles concerns 
third-parties.  Their rights are protected mostly by contract in the US, but contractual 
protection may be weak tea in developing economies lacking requisite enforcement 
infrastructure.194  The self-enforcing model restricts corporations from distributing assets 
to shareholders in derogation of third-party interests through dividends and repurchases.  
These are permitted only so long as, after the distribution, the corporation can pay its 
debts when due and assets exceed liabilities.195  Thus, the model polices both by applying 
the Model Act-type restrictions, which I earlier called principles-like in contrast to the 
dense rule-like Delaware provisions.196
 
 In addition to relying upon Model Act-type principles, these distribution 
restrictions are limited because they police only dividends and repurchases.  Corporations 
are inventive in distributing assets to shareholders using other devices in derogation of 
third-party rights.  To police these, the self-enforcing model relies upon vague general 
principles found in US fraudulent conveyance law.  That is, “a transaction is improper if 
(i) the company does not receive equivalent value, and (ii) the company fails an asset-
based or liquidity-based solvency test after the transaction.”197  Professors Black and 
Kraakman recognize that this is a principle not a rule, but note that this is the best that 
can be done.198  
 
 Appraisal rights offer another example of the inevitable need for principles.  In 
the Black-Kraakman model, appraisal rights are required and apply to a broader range of 
transactions than in US corporate law.199  As in US law, implementation of the appraisal 
remedy, even when contours are stated with rule-like particularly, requires judicial 
analysis using principles, including principles of financial valuation.200  Professors Black 
and Kraakman appreciate these limitations but find that there is no alternative.201  
 
 As a final example, rather than endorse typical US style provisions concerning 
self-interested transactions, the Black-Kraakman model provides a specific rule that 
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independent directors must apply when voting on such transactions.202  The model favors 
such a specific directive because it relieves directors from struggling with questions of 
financial fairness.  This is important for developing economies that lack norms that are 
prevalent in developed countries, where people understand financial fairness in terms of 
the relationship between price and value.   
 
 Although this achieves the desired rule-like feature, the explanation reflects an 
important challenge facing the self-enforcing model generally.  All provisions depend 
ultimately on the production of norms, especially a norm of following rules.  Without 
norms, why would anyone follow the rules?  Without adherence to rules, how can 
productive corporate norms form?  It is possible that bright-line rules alone can generate 
compliance norms.  But it seems more likely that a system that combines rules with 
principles will do so.203
 
 Indeed, while Professors Black and Kraakman outline many structural features of 
corporate law, they do not engage questions ordinarily entangled with fiduciary duties, 
other than self-interested transactions.  Thus, for good reason, their model does not 
address hostile takeover bids (they are absent or rare in emerging economies).  The self-
enforcing model does not consider problems that arise under the corporate opportunity 
doctrine.  Adding these features to the model would confirm the need for principles in 
creating a corporate law from scratch.204  The scholars rightly opt for the term self-
enforcing model rather than rules-based model, for the prescription shows the 
impossibility of fashioning a corporate law system that can fairly be called rules-based. 
 
 2.  Canada and Securities Regulation — Lawmakers in the Canadian province of 
British Columbia (BC) are more emphatic than Professors Black and Kraakman in 
announcing that they have drafted a principles-based system of securities regulation.  
They propose this as an alternative to what they see as a Canadian trend, led by Ontario, 
to follow the US “rules-based” model.  The BC lawmakers contended that their “new 
approach leaves behind the over-use of detailed and prescriptive rules in favour of an 
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outcomes-based approach founded on time-tested principles of investor protection: 
disclosure to investors and the regulation of dealers and brokers.”205   
 
 The proposed BC Act strives to express securities regulation in broad general 
terms, but many rule-like features appear.  In outline, the Act contains 12 parts, each 
divided into numerous sections and half divided first into multiple divisions then into 
numerous sub-sections.206  Examples of provisions falling toward the principles end of 
the continuum include laws governing market participant conduct.  The Act states general 
prohibitions (no engaging in manipulation, fraud or misrepresentation—as defined 
elsewhere with greater specificity) and then bans unfair practices (but must define these 
in a series of specific statements: no unreasonable pressure, no taking advantage of 
others, and no imposing inequitable terms). 
 
 The Act’s definition of “material information” is principles-like, as in the US and 
elsewhere.  The Act defines material information as “information relating to the business, 
operations or securities of an issuer that would reasonably be expected to significantly 
affect the value or market price of the issuer or a security of the issuer.”207  The Act uses 
the term material information 22 times.  The Act supplies a different but parallel 
definition of “significant information” applicable to mutual funds.  The Act uses the two 
terms together in numerous contexts but separately when prescribing prospectus 
disclosure requirements as between mutual funds and other issuers.208  Principles alone 
are insufficient to implement that distinction.  
 
 Several examples of provisions falling toward the rules end of the continuum 
appear.  The Act’s definitions section contains tight statements of the terms adviser, 
affiliate, associate, derivative, insider, market participant (listing 15 different categories 
of persons), offering and trade.  Subsequent sections contain specific definitions of 
additional terms.  The definition of security lists seven categories of instruments.  Given 
historical experience with novel and unanticipated instruments, one wonders whether this 
definition of security, which in any event is rule-like not principle-like, would be 
sufficient to cover future circumstances.209  The effort to define misrepresentation is 
particularly cumbersome, more nearly evincing attributes of rules than of principles.210
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 All the BC Act’s provisions concerning registration and offerings are stated in 
vague terms, exhibiting principles-like features.  Even so, they also contain rules and 
many rely upon the securities commission to provide additional regulation.  Thus 
registration provisions require registration or else a participant cannot trade or advise (a 
rule).211  They must apply for registration (a rule).  The securities commission can grant 
applications conditionally or restrictively (a principle).  The offering provisions prohibit 
offerings absent filing and receiving a receipt for a prospectus (a rule).  The prospectus 
must be “in the required form” (a rule, although the statute does not specify the form, 
presumably leaving this to the commission, which could use rules, principles or both).212
 
 The Act’s insider trading provisions also show effort to articulate pure principles 
but equally succumb, through pressure for certainty, to rule-like expression.  Thus 
insiders must “within the prescribed time” (a rule) “file a report in the required form” 
(another rule).213  The commission, again, is to establish the prescription and 
requirements.  Subsequent insider reports are required under stated circumstances 
(rules).214  The law bans insider trading and expressly states that this includes tipping.  
These provisions require defining the additional term “connected person.”215  This is a 
dense and complex definition bearing qualities of a rule, not a principle.216  The stated 
ban on insider trading is likewise dense, resembling a synthesis of pre-Act case law or 
enforcement actions—less a rule or a principle and more nearly a summary of prior 
applications. 
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 So notwithstanding conscious ambitions to create principles-based securities 
regulation, the BC approach does not quite live up to the billing.  True, the Act contains 
extensive provisions written in principle-like fashion.  But it cannot escape providing an 
express dose of rules, including specific action requirements, concept definitions and 
efforts at specification associated with rules.  It also leaves many details to be written by 
the securities commission—meaning that the full-blown system of securities regulation 
likely would have many more rules than appear in the Act.  Once applied in practice and 
allowed to interact, moreover, the result will be more rules yet and a systemic character 
that defies classification using the binary terminology of rules-based or principles-based. 
 
 3.  United States and Accounting — The Congress and the SEC have adopted the 
rhetoric of principles-based systems as well.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC 
to conduct a “study on the adoption by the US financial reporting system of a principles-
based accounting system.”217  This directive implicitly suggests that the current US 
accounting system is “rules-based,” a mistaken but widely-shared belief.218  
 
 In its study, the SEC identified the typical trade-offs of rules versus principles.  It 
then came down squarely on the side of promoting a principles-based system, although it 
dubbed it an objectives-oriented approach.  Consistent with conceptions outlined in Part I 
of this Article, the SEC observed that accounting provisions reside along a continuum 
according to their “degrees of specificity,” “ranging from the abstract, at one end, to the 
very specific at the other.”219  The SEC also denominated a class of principles-only 
provisions, defined as “high-level [provisions] with little if any operational guidance.”220  
The classic example of the latter is the concept of a reasonable speed in driving 
regulations.  Such “principle-only” provisions require exercising judgment without a 
reliable framework for doing so—and risk ad hoc enforcement arbitrariness.   
 
 The SEC minted and endorsed the concept of an “objectives-oriented” approach 
to assert that resulting provisions would “land solidly between the two ends of this 
spectrum.”221  Falling in line with contemporary global vocabulary, the SEC opined that 
an objectives-orientation would best be achieved using “principles-based” provisions.  
 
 The SEC explains that, in contrast to rules-based systems, a principles-based 
system uses concise statements of principle with the related objectives incorporated as an 
integral part.  Ideally, its provisions contain no or few exceptions, a modicum of 
guidance, and no bright-line tests and they are derived from an underlying coherent 
conceptual framework.222  Systems with these attributes are objectives-oriented because: 
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application entails fulfilling the objective and so minimizes strategic evasion; articulation 
entails coherence across the regulatory terrain; it eschews exceptions that produce 
inconsistencies; and it omits bright-lines that lead to different regulatory consequences 
for slightly different fact patterns.223
 
 Although the SEC position is superficially appealing and forceful, some 
perspective is in order.  As a background matter, there was an apparent dichotomy 
between complying with GAAP and providing a fair financial presentation.224  With 
some fanfare, the SEC addressed this possible dichotomy after Enron Corp. imploded by 
saying that if complying with GAAP does not produce a fair presentation, then 
compliance with GAAP is subordinated to promoting a fair presentation.225  In such 
cases, GAAP must be overridden.  However, this stance threatened the existing financial 
reporting system, which for decades had assumed that complying with GAAP would 
yield a fair presentation.226
 
 If too rule-bound, compliance with the GAAP rule-book would impair the 
possibility of meeting the fairly-presents principle.  A crisis loomed: if the widely-held 
assumption of US GAAP as rules-excessive was accurate, then it had to be reinvented—
post haste.  True, it might be possible to rehabilitate the relationship between GAAP and 
fair presentation through techniques such as presumptions or qualifications or scope 
limitations.  But at a broad level, if complying with rule-bound GAAP meant absence of 
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a fair presentation and fair presentation is privileged, then GAAP can become 
functionally irrelevant.    
 
 Rhetoric notwithstanding, the assumption of GAAP’s rule-bound nature was 
false.  The SEC found that existing US GAAP is a combination of rules and principles.  
While expressing a modest appreciation for the principles end of the spectrum, the SEC 
declared the existing mixture to be substantially effective, and re-labeled it an objectives-
oriented system.  The SEC concluded that, under such a system, there should be limited 
need to use GAAP overrides.  Complying with objectives-based GAAP yields financial 
statements that are fairly presented.  This conclusion thus resolved what otherwise 
loomed as a crisis: that US GAAP would have to be scrapped if it could not satisfy the 
fair presentation principle. 
 
 The SEC’s elaborate study of the rules-principles dichotomy shows the 
dichotomy’s falsity.  The SEC ultimately concluded that US GAAP is a mixture of 
principles and rules and, despite a modest gesture encouraging greater use of principles 
when possible, designates neither as inherently superior.  Instead, it embraces what it 
believes to be a hybrid, which it calls an “objectives-oriented” system.  It boils down to a 
different name for the prevailing variety of rules and principles, all intended to promote 
financial statements that “fairly present” financial condition and performance.    
 
 This resolution of the false dichotomy is correct and suggests that the struggle 
was more cathartic than substantive.  The issue is not whether a rules-based system or a 
principles-based system is superior (since they probably do not exist).  It is whether, for a 
given situation, a rule or principle is superior.  That depends, in turn, on the factors 
commonly identified as trade-offs (such as certainty versus context) and on how rules and 
principles are applied and how they interact.  The ideal form varies across subject matters 
within a system—in corporate law, securities regulation and accounting.  The question is 
indeed one of objectives. 
 
III. THEORIES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RHETORIC 
 
 Many countries around the world—plus Delaware judges and their apologists in 
corporate law, British Columbia in securities regulation and even Congress and the SEC 
when addressing accounting—are invoking the terminology of principles-based systems.  
The foregoing discussion counsels skepticism about whether such systems are possible, 
let alone desirable.  At best, it may be possible, within the universe of rules and 
principles, to weight a system heavily towards principles (or rules).  Why leaders appeal 
to this characterization is a curiosity that the following discussion explores.  It considers 
three possibilities summarized in the Introduction: the regulatory, ethical and political 
hypotheses.     
 
A.   Regulatory 
 
 A possible explanation for widespread talk of principles-based systems is to 
support regulatory resistance to otherwise powerful forces generating rules.  In many 
 47
contexts in recent years, the trend has been towards rules and away from principles.227  
Offsetting these trends by emphasizing principles can promote more cautious compliance 
attitudes among regulated actors. 
 
 1.  Trends Favoring Rules —  Five trends favoring rules can be identified.  First, 
people seek certainty, especially in financial markets.  Risk-assessment tools increasingly 
enable defining and measuring a range of risks, from interest and currency rate 
fluctuations and commodity price changes to political and weather hazards.228  This 
ability to measure such a variety of risks stokes an appetite to measure regulatory and 
enforcement risk too.  The perceived certainty that accompanies rules compared to 
principles leads to demand for rules.   
 
 Second, the “new governance” paradigm within administrative law envisions 
regulators and compliers increasingly participating together in promulgation exercises.229 
The administrative state has evolved into one of open government, collaborative 
governance, and extensive private standard setting.230  In such regulatory negotiations, it 
is not surprising that resulting articulations would be less vague, with constituents 
asserting needs for qualifications, exceptions and other features of rules.231  When the 
process increases the prospect of regulatory capture, the probability of producing more 
rules than principles arises.   
 
 A third factor driving rules-proliferation is the ascendancy of “interpretive 
textualism.”  This refers to the practice of emphasizing literal expressions, especially by 
judges, when interpreting statutory or regulatory language.  It resists infusing those 
materials with penumbral principles.232 Legislators and regulators may respond with 
increasing care and attention to selected words, entailing a quest to squeeze out 
vagueness when drafting that yields rules.  This can, in turn, become a part of legal 
culture and lead practitioners to follow suit.233   
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 Fourth, increasing specialization and fragmentation create incentives among 
proprietors and professionals to claim expertise and regulators to claim turf.234  The value 
of rents that such groups can claim is greater when specialized rules govern rather than 
broad general principles.  Such specialization and fragmentation arise in securities 
markets because old-fashioned industrial issuers differ markedly from mutual funds and 
these both differ from hedge funds; common stock and straight-debt differ markedly from 
preferred stock, call or put options, asset-backed debt, strips, and derivatives.  Rules 
result. 
 
 Fifth, professional advisors participating in transactions demand rules, not 
principles.  Sometimes they need support from specific rulebooks to cite when 
encouraging clients to take conservative or prudential approaches.235  Litigation risk 
bolsters this demand, especially evident in accounting, where auditors demand rules 
rather than principles.236  Across all settings where risks and pressures of rent-seeking are 
high—whether for those seeking clean audit letters, legal opinions or no-action letters—
rules that limit or eliminate discretion help to deflect such appeals.237   
 
 2.  A Need for Principles — These impressive forces may generate more complex 
and technical rules than is ideal with such volume that weakens the weight or vividness 
of associated principles.  When more rules are produced and fewer or weaker principles 
are available to mediate them, the traditionally accepted trade-offs between rules and 
principles may be upset and the benefits of their iterative relationship impaired.  An 
excess of rules makes it easier to treat rules as blueprints to achieve absurd results.  A 
useful response to excessive rule production is a regulatory emphasis on principles, in 
fact and in rhetoric.  This inclination provides a plausible explanation for prevailing 
inclinations to celebrate “principles-based systems” of law or accounting.   
 
 In this view, a “principles-based system” has a broad regulatory enforcement 
power able to police not just compliance with specific rules but fulfillment of broad 
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Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 17 (2004) (“as the accounting norms 
themselves became more complicated and subjective, the ability to confidently say ‘no’ to a client 
diminished”). 
 
236 See, e.g, George J. Benston, Public (U.S.) Compared to Private (U.K.) Regulation of Corporate 
Financial Disclosure, 51 ACCT. REV. 483 (1976); Stephen A. Zeff, A Perspective on the U.S. 
Public/Private Sector Approach to the Regulation of Financial Reporting, 9 ACCT. HORIZONS 52 (1995). 
 
237 See Stewart E. Sterk, Information Production and Rent-Seeking in Law School Administration: Rules 
and Discretion, 83 BU L. REV. 1141 (2003). 
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general principles.  It does so by equipping regulatory agencies that combine rule-making 
authority with enforcement power to emphasize principles rather than rules to bolster 
their enforcement arsenals.238  This capability can elicit greater cautiousness among 
regulated actors and, by making this vivid, reduce temptation to exploit rules when doing 
so produces absurd results. 
 
 To illustrate, compare the rules-heavy self-enforcing model of corporate law with 
the principles-rich British Columbia securities regulation proposal and principles-
encouraging SEC study on US GAAP.239  The self-enforcing model is designed to 
minimize the role of external enforcement in favor of internal enforcement.  To that end, 
it relies as much as possible on rules.  The British Columbia proposal and SEC study 
reflect the opposite appetite.  They favor principles.  That approach takes seriously the 
possibility of expansive external enforcement powers based on those principles. 
 
 Regulators periodically rely on principles in their enforcement arsenal to address 
discrete bouts of deviance in which rules either do not exist or are not clearly 
applicable.240  For example, the SEC used principles to launch its campaign against 
insider trading in the mid-1980s.241  It did so to address plagues associated with junk 
bonds in the early 1990s and, along with states attorney general, research analysts and 
mutual fund market timing in the early 2000s.242  It used principles in enforcement to 
address novel problems arising from technological innovation and political change at the 
dawns of the Internet243 and globalization.244  
 
 These examples of principles-based enforcement support the regulatory 
hypothesis as an enforcement-expanding device, but simultaneously show a descriptive 
weakness in this hypothesis to explain the recent rise of principles-based vocabulary: they 
                                                 
238 See ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1982); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of 
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Agency Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965); Lon L. 
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). 
 
239 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
240 See William R. McLucas, J. Lynn Taylor, & Susan A. Mathews, A Practitioner’s Guide to the SEC’s 
Investigative and Enforcement Process, 70 TEMP.  L. REV. 53 at n.74 (1997).   
 
241 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
242 Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 
CONN. INS. L. J. 107 (2004). 
 
243 E.g., SEC v. Spencer, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,856 (Mar. 29, 1996) (Internet solicitation of investors 
promising 50% returns); SEC v. Frye, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,720 (Nov. 15, 1995) (Internet solicitation of 
investor promising risk-free profits); SEC v. Odulo, SEC Lit. Rel. Nos. 14,591 (Aug. 7, 1995), and 14,616 
(Aug.  24, 1995) (Internet solicitation promising 20% return). 
 
244 See In re Candies, Inc., Sec. Act Rel. No. 7,263 (Feb. 21, 1996) (cease-and-desist proceeding against 
law firm assisting in scheme to violate registration requirements by distributing abroad unregistered stock 
that was promptly resold into US); SEC v. Scorpion Technologies, Inc., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 14,814 (Feb. 9, 
1996) (injunction to stop illegal Regulation S offering of stock in 20 countries). 
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show that such discretionary enforcement always exists as an option.  A difference may 
be how, in the given examples, deviance was isolated and not closely connected to extant 
rules.  In contrast, the Enron era created a perception that too many rules bred pervasive 
“creative compliance”—technical adherence to rules but lacking fidelity to their spirit.245  
As an example, people could design deals that met clearly applicable accounting rules 
expressed in numerical thresholds, such as 3% or 50%, despite absurd results that 
impaired the principle of fair presentation.246
 
 However, the regulatory hypothesis faces other weaknesses as a descriptive 
matter.  First, the rhetoric about “principles-based systems” is stronger than a mere shift 
in regulatory strategy.  It does not speak to a balance between rules and principles but 
pronounces the emphatic superiority of principles.  Second, while the explanation may 
appear plausible for the SEC and British Columbia, it carries little credibility in the case 
of Delaware, which is notoriously reluctant to impose liability on directors of its 
corporations.247   
 
 Third, regulators responded to the recent debacles with new rules as well as new 
principles and rhetoric.  For example, in response to the Enron chairman Ken Lay’s 
disingenuous defense that he did not know the details of Enron’s financial statements, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act prescribed a rule that corporate officers must certify that they know 
the details of financial statements;248  and in response to the era’s widespread accounting 
shenanigans, the SEC adopted rules to police the use of non-GAAP financial measures 
and off-balance sheet financing arrangements.249   
 
                                                 
245 See Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the 
Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD.  L. REV. 848 (1991). 
 
246 Cf. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 913 & 920 (D.D.C.) (Sporkin, D.J.) (“an 
accountant must not blindly apply accounting conventions without reviewing the transaction to determine 
whether it makes any economic sense and without first finding that the transaction is realistic and has 
economic substance that would justify the booking of the transaction that occurred;” “It seems that the 
accounting firm was more concerned with attempts of conscientious regulators to deal with the savings and 
loans industry's severe crisis than the ‘creative accounting’ of its ‘high flying" client’.”).  My example is 
hypothetical, certainly not based on Enron, which flatly violated such rules.  See Bratton, Rules Versus 
Principles, supra note ___, at 1041. 
 
247 See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, Outside Director Liability, supra note ___.  
 
248 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §§ 302(a) & 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350; see SEC, CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE 
IN COMPANIES’ QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL REPORTS, RELEASE NO. 33-8124 (Aug. 28, 2002); Michael 
Perino, Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 
681-85 (2002). 
 
249 See SEC, Cautionary Advice Regarding Use of Pro Forma Financial Information in Earnings Releases, 
Nos. 33-8039 & 34-45124 (Dec. 4, 2001); SEC, Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 
Nos. 33-8176  & 34-47226 (Jan. 22, 2003); SEC, Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements (Jan. 28, 2003); SEC, 
Reg. G, 17 C.F.R. 244.101(c).  These are interesting specimens because the SEC describes the documents 
as taking “principles-based” approaches despite showing rule-like qualities.  See Partnoy, A Revisionist 
View of Enron, supra note ___ at 1276. 
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 The regulatory hypothesis poses two additional difficulties as a normative matter.  
Both arise from how this strategy can tip the balance unduly in the principles direction.  
First, this can induce excessively cautious compliance outlooks that impair the benefits of 
rules (which, in this context, could include deterring desirable risk-taking).250  Second, a 
determined enforcement preference to focus on principles instead of rules could backfire 
when incongruent with accepted notions of fairness and legitimacy.   
 
B.  Ethical 
 
 A second possibility is that the rhetoric of “principles-based systems” is part of a 
more general exhortation.  What Enron-type scandals showed was not a failure of rules 
but the failure of a different set of principles: ethics.  The global embrace of principles-
based systems may be intended less as a description of the relative specificity or ex ante 
content of provisions as between rules and principles and more of an appeal to ethics.  
Principles-based regulation may be a call to ethical principles.  This would also explain 
why the global rhetoric uses the term principles rather than the term standards so 
prevalent in the legal literature.251  If so, labels may matter more than some think.252
 
 1.  Hortatory — The rise of enthusiasm for principles-based systems corresponds 
to the post-Enron discourse that lamented laxity in business ethics.253   Some worried that 
professionalism had diminished in favor of pure profit-maximization and notions of the 
public good and public service among the professions needed reaffirmation.254  The 
discourse exhibited a quest to restore a heightened sense of business and professional 
ethics.   
 
 The rhetoric of principles-based systems may be a by-product of this quest.  This 
may be so because, while regulatory tools can contribute to promoting ethical norms, 
they cannot do so alone.255  Consider again the practice of creative compliance: literal 
                                                 
250 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal 
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).  
 
251 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
252 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___ (noting how some scholars dismiss the proliferation of 
labels to describe types of laws as nominalism with limited substantive import). 
 
253 E.g., Bill Witherell, Corporate Governance: Stronger Principles for Better Market Integrity, OECD 
OBSERVER (April 2004) (announcing release of OECD, Revised Principles of Corporate Governance, 
retaining previous “principles-based” approach but emphasizing need to reexamine the previous guidelines 
in response to global debacles). 
 
254 See Bevis Longstreth, Problems in the Corporate Bar as it Appears to a Retired Practitioner, 31 
MONTANA LAWYER 22 (2006); William W. Bratton, Jr., Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Peter C. Kostant, Sacred Cows or Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric in 
Justifying Some Current Norms of Transactional Lawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49 (2001); W. 
Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. L. REV. 1167 (2005). 
 
255 To paraphrase T. S. Eliot, regulators cannot realistically expect to fashion a system so perfect that no 
one needs to be good. 
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obedience to law while evading its spirit.256  To an extent, creative compliance is 
unobjectionable, as when structuring a business combination to avoid triggering 
shareholder voting or appraisal rights or designing a lease to obtain capital treatment.  
When done overzealously, as during the Enron era, the practice of creative compliance is 
treacherous.  Either way, however, law cannot do anything to punish compliance with 
itself (nor can accounting). True, in corporate law equitable principles can police mere 
technical compliance257 and in securities regulation the broad-gauged anti-abuse 
principles contribute.258  But, in general, regulatory pursuit of creative compliance is 
Quixotic—except perhaps through rhetoric.259
 
 Recognizing this, regulators turned to codes of business ethics.  The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act required the SEC to promulgate rules requiring public disclosure of whether a 
company has a code of ethics for senior officers and, if not, why not.260  Companies must 
promptly disclose changes to ethics codes, including waivers.  The New York Stock 
Exchange contemporaneously imposed a requirement that listed companies adopt and 
disclose a code of business conduct and ethics.261  The US Sentencing Guidelines were 
amended in 2004 to take express account of whether an enterprise promoted business 
ethics, including through adoption of formal codes.262
 
 The resulting codes of ethics are fascinating: they are all brief, abstract, simple 
and similar, often emphasizing adherence to the “spirit of laws.”263  The codes may be 
truly “principles-based”—they are vague and contain barely a trace of “rules.”264  While 
                                                 
256 See McBarnet & Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law, supra note ___. 
 
257 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___ and ___-___ (noting the Schnell doctrine in Delaware 
judicial administration).  
 
258 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
259 The limitations on general anti-abuse principles appear vividly in tax law, where the principles exist but 
rarely are enforced.  
 
260 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 726 (“code of ethics” are “such standards as are reasonably 
necessary to promote (1) honest and ethical conduct .  .  .  (2) full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable 
disclosure .  .  .   and (3) compliance with applicable governmental rules and regulations”). 
 
261 See SEC, Self-Regulatory Orgs., NYSE, Inc. & NASDAQ, Inc., Order Approving Proposed Rule 
Changes, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,180 (Nov. 12, 2003); NYSE Rule 303A(10) (2003). 
 
262 See David Hess, Robert S. McWhorter & Timothy L. Fort, The 2004 Amendments to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN.  L. 725 (2006). 
 
263 See Doreen McBarnet, After Enron: Will “Whiter than White Collar Crime” Still Wash? 46 BRIT.  J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 1091 (2006).  
 
264 Why this is so requires speculation and competing explanations seem plausible, as neither Sarbanes-
Oxley nor related SEC regulations give specific guidance or requirements.  On the one hand, the codes are 
textual embodiments of aspirational corporate culture and thus would not likely contain detailed rules; on 
the other, companies must promptly disclose waivers of ethics codes, some of which likely will be 
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promulgators of law and accounting cannot create principles-based systems, using that 
vocabulary can reinforce the lessons in the codes.  This interpretation of the rhetoric as 
emphasizing ethical principles also explains frequent talk among regulators and 
politicians of the need to fight “check-the-box” mentalities.265
 
 2.  Qualifications — The ethical hypothesis to explain the rise of principles-based 
rhetoric seems credible, but two qualifications are in order, one descriptive and one 
normative.  Descriptively, such a call to ethical rejuvenation implicitly assumes a decline 
in ethics during the relevant period.  Such periodic laments recur in history, and there is 
limited basis for believing that a golden age of high ethics marked earlier periods.266  
This is almost certainly so in the case of corporate, securities and accounting matters.  
While thoughtful scholars conclude that the Enron era exhibited a decline in business 
ethics,267  it seems impossible to reach firm conclusions about that. 
 
  Normatively, this strategy of emphasizing principles in law and accounting could 
backfire.  Ethics code exhortations to abide the spirit of laws—a call to principles that can 
curtail creative compliance—project a moral appeal that may be desirable.  But for 
leaders to couple such codes with rhetorical stories of principles-based systems could 
generate false confidence that resulting law or accounting will cure the disease.  The 
temptation, implicit in the celebration of principles-based systems, is to imagine that rules 
should be eliminated.  My analysis suggests that this is neither possible nor wise.   
 
C. Political 
 
 A third possible explanation for rhetoric championing principles-based legal or 
accounting systems is political.  Descriptively, this seems to be a stronger explanation for 
the prevalent campaign for principles-based systems compared to the regulatory and 
ethical hypotheses.  Normatively, it is the most troubling of the three hypotheses—and 
                                                                                                                                                 
uncomfortable to explain and broad general statements will minimize the frequency of waivers that must be 
disclosed.  
 
265 See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing: The Case for Reuniting Ownership and 
Control, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 254, 280 (2004) (quoting SEC Chairman William Donaldson as saying 
that “A ‘check the box’ approach to good corporate governance will not inspire a true sense of ethical 
obligation.”); Nicholas Le Pan, Financial Regulatory Outlook, 23 CANADIAN NAT’L BANKING L. REV. 52 
(Dec. 2004) (remarks of Canada’s Superintendent of Financial Institutions noting his office’s regulatory 
effort to “resist the temptation to put in place detailed new rules” and noting concern that “too many 
detailed new rules can be counter-productive. They risk becoming a checklist and then their benefit is, at 
best, greatly reduced. . . .”); Harvey Pitt, Public Statement by SEC Chairman: Remarks at the Winter Bench 
and Bar Conference of the Federal Bar Council (Feb. 19, 2002) (US GAAP is too “cumbersome and offer 
far too detailed prescriptive requirements [which], by necessity, encourages accountants to ‘check the 
boxes’—that is, to read accounting principles narrowly, to ascertain whether there is technical compliance 
with applicable accounting principles”). 
 
266 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1984); MOSES PAVA, THE 
SEARCH FOR MEANING IN ORGANIZATIONS: SEVEN PRACTICAL QUESTIONS FOR ETHICAL MANAGERS 
(1999); LAURA P. HARTMAN, PERSPECTIVES IN BUSINESS ETHICS  (2nd ed.  2001). 
 
267 See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD (2006). 
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the most cynical, although it is not idiosyncratic.268  Prescriptively, it contributes to 
debate concerning the merits of jurisdictional competition by raising questions not 
previously addressed in that literature.   
 
 The literature on the jurisdictional competition debate, which spans across 
numerous legal and other fields, is particularly robust in the contexts that this Article 
addresses of corporate law, securities regulation and accounting.  Contested topics 
include whether competition exists, on what terms, and how to assess the results.  The 
following discussion of recent political jockeying supports the view that competition 
exists among the actors in these contexts.  Ensuing discussion explains how these 
observations contribute one new reason to question the efficacy of jurisdictional 
competition when the risk of rhetorical overstatement is significant.   
 
 1.  Jurisdictional Competition — The following discussion considers how the 
principles-based rhetoric may be explained in terms of competition among (a) Delaware 
and Washington, D.C. in US corporate law, (b) British Columbia and Ontario in 
Canadian securities regulation, (c) international accounting promulgators and the 
SEC/FASB and (d) various countries in a more general geopolitical context. 
 
 a. Delaware versus Washington D.C.  The jurisdictional competition debate was 
particularly vigorous concerning the production of state corporation law in the US.269  
Participants mostly now agree that, while there may have been some form of competition 
among states decades ago, that race largely is over and no or little current competition 
exists.270  Delaware prevailed.  The literature has turned attention to a race of a different 
sort, replacing the horizontal competition among states with a vertical competition 
between Delaware and Washington, D.C.271  
 
                                                 
268 See David Alexander & Eva Jermakowicz, A True and Fair View of the Principles/Rules Debate, 42 
ABACUS 132 (2006) (concerning rules-principles debate in accounting, “much of the debate at the 
regulatory and policy level is at best vague and confused, more likely disingenuous, possibly intellectually 
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269 See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 
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Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987). 
 
270 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L. REV. 
401 (1994); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the 
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth 
of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & 
Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 
(2002).  
 
271  See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004). 
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 In the new competition, Delaware corporate lawyers, including judges, fight a 
political battle with Washington for hegemony in the production of US corporate 
governance law.272   While this battle has endured for decades,273 serving as the fallback 
position to claims that state competition yields undesirable results, the stakes have risen 
since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act when Washington preempted numerous areas of 
corporate law traditionally handled by states.  Since provisions of that Act were widely 
lambasted as rules-based, a competitive political response would distinguish Delaware’s 
corporate law as principles-based.274   
 
 Playing a leading role in this contest, Delaware’s judges are unusual among 
courts, in at least the following ways that support the political hypothesis.275  Delaware 
judges frequently write articles that are published in law reviews.276  While some of these 
provide thoughtful analysis and reflection, in recent installations, the articles are 
increasingly promotional of the Delaware judiciary’s expertise,277 extol the virtues of 
Delaware corporate law (including the claim that it is “principles-based”)278 and harshly 
contrast those virtues with the vices of federal securities regulation (making their claim 
that it is “rules-based” seem reserved by comparison).279  In at least some Delaware 
judicial opinions released since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, analysis shows that 
the courts are attempting to respond to the political and competitive climate that 
resulted.280
                                                 
272 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 605 (2003) (quoting a statement 
made in 1988 by the Chair of the Delaware Bar Association Corporate Law Council that Delaware had to 
modify its anti-takeover laws to avoid federal incursion into the state’s corporate law). For a rebuttal, see 
Roberta Romano, Is Jurisdictional competition a Problem of Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 2005 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 31 at n. 19 (March 2005). 
 
273 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 461 (1989). 
 
274 Cf. Kamar, A Jurisdictional competition Theory Of Indeterminacy In Corporate Law, supra note ___ 
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decisions). 
 
275 See also Fisch, Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts, supra note ___, at 1072-1082 (exploring how 
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276 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 
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277 See Griffith & Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism, supra note ___, at 2.  Steele is a Delaware judge. 
 
278 See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism in the American Corporate 
Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 
979 (2003) (trumpeting Delaware corporate law as “principles-based” and denigrating federal securities 
regulation as “problematic” because “not part of any overall system of corporate governance”). 
 
279 Griffith & Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism, supra note ___, at 3. 
 
280 Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism, supra note ___, at ___. 
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 These developments reflect a different tenor of competition in the vertical sphere 
between Delaware and Washington than obtained under the horizontal competition with 
other states.  The horizontal competition among states, such as Delaware and New York, 
involved products that are substitutes.  The competition hinged on the substantive 
products.  Losses in the competition were not devastating, with some would-be Delaware 
customers simply choosing New York.   
 
 The vertical competition between Delaware and Washington does not involve 
substitutes but products akin to bundled goods: a US corporation wishing to be public 
must both be incorporated in a state and registered with the SEC.  The stakes for 
Delaware in this vertical competition are considerably higher than in the horizontal 
competition because Washington can preempt Delaware.  That means Delaware’s leaders 
have stronger incentives to become not only entrepreneurs but a sales force.281   This may 
help to explain the increasing exuberance that Delaware judges show in boasting of their 
state’s products.  In this competition, the SEC has lesser incentives to respond and, in any 
event, its ability to stake positions is constrained by limitations of the Data Quality Act 
that prevent it from engaging in the rhetorical overstatement that characterizes the 
Delaware courts.282
 
 b. British Columbia versus Ontario.  Unlike in the US, Canada lacks a central 
authority in securities regulation such as the SEC.  Instead, laws are promulgated by the 
13 provinces and territories and enforced by commissions and tribunals of the respective 
regions.283  Each province uses governmental securities commissions or administrators to 
oversee respective provincial securities laws.  The provinces may compete in these terms 
but not quite in the way that US states competed for charters.  There are no charters to 
fight over but provinces contend for leadership in designing the regulatory system, power 
to promulgate and enforce law, and contribute to the national market system.   
 
                                                 
281 Delaware Supreme Court opinions have often been characterized by language more common to sales 
literature than to legal analysis.  E.g, Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc. v. Jaffari & Malek LLC, 727 A.2d 286, 290 
(Del. 1999) (Veasey, C.J.) (“Since 1983, the General Assembly has amended the LP Act eleven times, with 
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reverses its Chancery Court.  See Griffith & Steele, supra note ___, at 10, n. 50  (acknowledging contrary 
evidence in the post-Enron years noted in Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism, supra note ___).  It 
almost always produces unanimous opinions.  This is surprising for law so often called indeterminate and 
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282 See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-554; 
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Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Notice; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 
(February 22, 2002); SEC, Final Data Quality Assurance Guidelines (June 10, 2005). 
 
283 See DAVID JOHNSTON & KATHLEEN DOYLE ROCKWELL, CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION (3d ed. 
2003) at xxxvii ff. (“Table of Concordance”); CONDON, ANAND & SARRA, supra note __, at 265 
(discussing variations in the laws and noting degrees of harmony).  
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 Provincial autonomy is threatened by ongoing efforts to promote national 
consistency and harmonization of securities regulation across Canada.284   Provincial 
securities commissions and administrators recently formed a national group, called the 
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) to provide a coordinating function.   Current 
forces are strong in favor of moving Canada from its existing fragmented structure to a 
federal system with a single national regulator.  This struggle implicates the balance of 
power between the provincial and central governments and among the provinces.   
 
 Some provinces, including British Columbia, resist the centralized model because 
of fear that it will be dominated by Ontario, the money-center province that is seen as 
inclined to follow the US and its allegedly rules-based securities regulation.  The British 
Columbia principles-based securities regulation proposal can be seen as a political gambit 
to resist that power.  Ontario’s Securities Commission replied with a blistering comment 
letter which,285  while substantively meritorious, likewise has overtones of a political 
response.286   
 
 c. US versus International Accounting.  Some form of competition has existed for 
years between the SEC/FASB and IFRS promulgators.287  The SEC historically provided 
international leadership on accounting matters, filling the lacuna that exists in the 
international arena which lacks a centralized power.288  In this leadership, the SEC both 
bears the costs of international regime formation and places its cultural imprint on the 
process and results.  In accounting, the SEC and FASB use unilateral and bilateral 
diplomacy and pressure to influence promulgators of alternative accounting systems in a 
process in which the SEC exerts and succumbs to political pressures.289
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n. 119 (1999) (“adherence to GAAP has been a bully pulpit for the SEC and other policy makers to 
champion improving regulatory developments in many foreign markets” and summarizing numerous 
unilateral and bilateral SEC efforts to influence securities regulation and accounting worldwide). 
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 Promulgators of IFRS have been a potent political force in these engagements and 
are an increasingly credible and influential competitor to FASB.   The SEC nurtured this 
role by initially insisting that IFRS adhere to criteria that the SEC established.  The 
SEC’s strategy was competitive: designed as “a surrogate investigation of the prevailing 
culture of the [IFRS promulgators].”290  IFRS promulgators responded by developing a 
robust accounting system, with one eye on those criteria and another on the substantive 
merits of particular provisions.  In the process, they developed not only a system that the 
SEC takes seriously but one that constitutes a credible rival to US GAAP.  Ultimately, 
these competitive political realities pressure the SEC to accept IFRS.291  In this climate, 
the SEC has pushed increasingly for convergence, not divergence.292   
 
 This background sets the stage for a political account of prevailing rhetoric, which 
operates at two levels of competition between IFRS and US GAAP.  A primary 
competition involves products that can be seen as substitutes: large multinational 
corporations may choose which system to treat as their primary means of financial 
reporting.  To that extent, the promulgators compete by offering substantive alternatives 
from which companies can choose.  The secondary competition arises from how 
consumers choosing US GAAP are assured that countries worldwide will accept their 
financial statements as complying with minimum standards whereas, at present, IFRS is 
not so widely recognized.  As a result, large corporations throughout the world use US 
GAAP or face investor pressure to do so, giving the SEC and FASB dominion.293
 
 IFRS must achieve more power both to attract new customers in the primary 
competition and to influence ongoing articulation of accounting provisions of the SEC 
and FASB in the secondary competition.  It must both offer a different product and 
persuade consumers—and other regulators—that its product is superior. Helpful to doing 
so is denominating US GAAP as rules-based—and denigrating such an approach—while 
describing IFRS as principles-based.  The SEC and FASB return the volley either by 
                                                 
290 Id. at 1251. 
 
291 Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note ___, at 1208 (noting how rising stature of IASC during the mid-
1990s presented the SEC with a difficult decision concerning whether to recognize its accounting standards 
for SEC filings and how the SEC therefore engaged with IASC, directly and through the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), laying out basic criteria it would have to meet and 
providing a “stream of comment letters” on IASC proposals). 
 
292 Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note ___, at 1202 (noting that “the SEC continues to promote 
convergence” between IFRS and U.S. GAAP but faces “political considerations” in doing so). 
 
293 See Richard W. Painter. Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 397, 400 n.6 (2004) (“European companies generally use International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), which supposedly promote “standards based” instead of “rule based” accounting, but 
there is considerable pressure from U.S. investors for European companies to conform to U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)”). 
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explaining their version of a principles-based system (the objectives-oriented model) or 
claiming that US GAAP is principles-based too.294   
 
 d. Other Countries.  Other countries may take up the principles-based banner as a 
result of broader geopolitical realities.  First, principles-based sloganeering may reflect 
efforts to signal mature rather than developing country status.  The self-enforcing model 
of corporate law designed by Professors Black and Kraakman makes the case for rules in 
corporate laws of emerging economies.295  US governmental representatives make 
similar cases concerning securities regulation to countries such as China.296  It would be 
unsurprising if countries publicized having principles-based legal and accounting systems 
to signal maturity beyond the rules-based stage of development. 
 
 Second, the label “rules-based” is used in national economic policy to designate 
things like fixed exchange rates, interest rate adjustments and budgeting policy (such as 
the rule against government borrowing to pay current costs but only to make 
investments).297  In contrast are “discretionary policies,” flexible fiscal and monetary 
tools to influence economic demand and smooth business cycle vicissitudes.  The 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank strongly favor rules, especially for 
emerging economies.298  But individual countries like discretionary policies to retain 
autonomy.  When rules are imposed on emerging economies, it would be unsurprising for 
countries to join a bandwagon boasting that they offer principles-based systems.  
 
 2.  Limitations — If reports of principles-based systems are intended to 
distinguish legal/accounting products, the impossibility of offering such products makes 
the reports misleading.  This by-product of jurisdictional competition is not explicitly 
addressed in prevalent debates concerning the merits of this phenomenon in corporate 
law, securities regulation or accounting.   But if jurisdictional competition can produce 
misleading rhetoric, it is possible that the otherwise virtuous process of competition 
among regulators is impaired. 
                                                 
294 See supra note ___ (quoting FASB member Schiffer to this effect).  In the SEC’s case, constraints 
imposed by the Data Quality Act limit its rhetorical freedom to compete.  See supra note ___. 
 
295 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
296 See, e.g., Walter Lukken (CFTC Commissioner), Speech to China Financial Derivatives Forum 
(Shanghai, September 26, 2006) (reported in Securities Law Daily, Sept.  29, 2005) (advanced economies 
need principles as in recent CFTC codification (CFMA)—but for immature markets “a rules-based 
regulatory regime is essential”) 
 
297 See Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, in WORLD BANK RES.  
OBSERVER 1, 3-4 (1998) (“rules-first strategy” of law reform); Middle East Policy Council, Joining the 
Global Rules-Based Economy: Challenges and Opportunities for the GCC, (available at 
http://www.mepc.org/main/main.asp). 
 
298 GEORGE KOPITS (ED.), RULES-BASED FISCAL POLICY IN EMERGING MARKETS: BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS 
AND PROSPECTS (2004); TERESA DABÁN, ET AL. RULES-BASED FISCAL POLICY IN FRANCE, GERMANY, 
ITALY, AND SPAIN (IMF, 2003); see also Pablo Zapatero, Searching for Coherence in Global Economic 
Policymaking, 24 PA. ST. INT’L L. REV. 595, 621-622 (discussing rule-based coordination among IMF and 
other international economic institutions) 
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 The jurisdictional competition model is contested but, when its assumptions 
obtain, the model is plausible enough. The model, as applied to corporate law, securities 
regulation and accounting, envisions regulators as producers of goods and investors as 
consumers.299  The model is appealing when a large number of producers offer a 
complete range of goods and consumers command perfect information about offerings 
and can switch between them with little cost.300  Both visions require that perfect 
information about products be available to investors and understood accurately by them, 
plausible to the same extent that relatively efficient capital markets are plausible.301
 
 But misleading regulatory characterizations weaken the information-based 
assumptions of the jurisdictional competition model.  Ordinarily, imperfect information is 
ameliorated by intermediaries who charge fees to “channel information to consumers.”302  
For example, in the state corporation charter competition story, customers used corporate 
lawyers to provide truthful objective assessments of the alternatives.303   They and 
securities lawyers and accountants can serve like functions within their respective 
specialties in the current competitions.   
 
 Yet regulatory misstatement diminishes expert ability to filter information 
effectively.  Indeed, especially in a competitive climate, many professionals have stakes 
in the outcome, as where Delaware lawyers or IFRS-trained accountants have incentives 
to echo official regulatory pronouncements.  Rhetorical overstatement also makes it more 
difficult for professionals to communicate information effectively to clients who are led, 
through public statements, to believe the rhetoric. There are limited mechanisms to 
constrain or filter regulatory misstatements.  While the SEC is subject to the Data Quality 
                                                 
299 The roots of the prevailing model of jurisdictional competition reside in one originally focused on the 
production of public goods.  William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of 
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997) 
(exploring and refining original contribution of Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 
64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)). 
 
300 Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note ___, at 1231-32 ((citing Tiebout, supra note ___, at 419); Bratton 
& McCarey, supra note ___, at 222-236 (discussing the consequences of relaxing the assumptions of the 
Tiebout model). 
 
301 In efficient capital markets, discounts are assigned to the securities of issuers in less-preferred regimes 
compared to prices of securities governed by more-preferred regimes.  Issuers respond by relocating to 
regimes where no discounts are imposed.  See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note ___, at 1230-1231 
(summarizing but criticizing the argument). 
 
302 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note ___, at 275.  Professors Bratton and McCahery discuss this point 
in the context of competition for factors of production, id. at 268-276, but this provides a lesson concerning 
information.   
 
303 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note ___, at 267.   
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Act limitations that command regulatory accuracy, promulgators of IFRS, Delaware and 
British Columbia are not.304  
 
 Regulatory mischaracterization is a problem for all philosophical dispositions 
implicated in debates over jurisdictional competition. Proponents assume that 
government actors exhibit business-like integrity; public interest theory views 
government as benevolent; and even public choice theory portrays government as 
responsive to private rent-seeking.  Each of these accounts changes if regulatory 
competitors are susceptible to the same kinds of weaknesses of misleading statements 
that traditional business enterprises can engage in.  Integrity, benevolence and 
responsiveness are impaired.  Thus, jurisdictional competition debate may hinge, in part, 
on philosophical views concerning relative confidence in markets versus governments to 
promote social ends.305  But this analysis adds a limitation to its efficacy when 
sloganeering is misleading and neither consumers nor their professional advisors can be 
counted upon to pierce it.   
 
 The additional argument does not mean that jurisdictional competition is never 
preferred.  Rather, it means that the presence or risk of regulatory overstatement is a 
factor which deserves explicit recognition in the assessment.  It appears to exist in the 
three specific contexts considered, making this a factor against unbridled jurisdictional 
competition in these contexts.  It is uncertain whether that means that superior results 
would follow from alternatives to jurisdictional competition, such as harmonization. 
What is certain is the prudence of questioning the rhetoric invoking rules-based and 
principles-based systems. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Rules and principles are imperfect categories to describe individual legal or 
accounting provisions.  While some provisions may fit neatly into such categories, 
rational systems of law or accounting partake of both types and hybrids running across a 
continuum.  Even when it is possible to classify individual provisions as rules or 
principles, fairly characterizing entire systems as rules-based or principles-based is an 
essentially impossible task.  In addition to examining all the individual provisions within 
the system, one would have to account for how they are applied and how they interact. 
Once those stages of a system are accounted for, and the benefits appreciated, it is 
difficult to conclude that any system of corporate law, securities regulation or accounting 
                                                 
304 See supra note ___.  Indeed, sovereign immunity likely would insulate states and state actors from 
exposure to liability for false advertising.  See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
 
305 See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note ___, at 1231-32 (noting that arguments on behalf of 
jurisdictional competition’s virtues made separately by Professors Romano and Mahoney all display 
mistrust of government such that the arguments are equally persuasive to support abolishing mandatory 
disclosure or privatization of regulatory functions); Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets?: A 
Political Economy of Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363, 1367-
68 (noting the market-preferring orientation of devotees of jurisdictional competition).    
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systems can be rules-based or principles-based.  Surveys of these fields warrant 
skepticism about the accuracy of such descriptive claims. 
 
  Why global rhetoric championing principles-based systems is flourishing 
requires speculation.  The phenomenon is possibly due to a combination of regulatory 
desire to provide a counterweight to demand for rules, a quest to rejuvenate ethics and a 
desire to distinguish a jurisdiction’s legal-financial products.  The first and second 
explanations seem credible and largely benign, although they pose some risk of 
backfiring if regulators become overzealous.  The third seems most descriptively accurate 
but also most normatively troubling.  If it is infeasible to establish a principles-based 
system of corporate law, securities regulation or accounting, then it is misleading to 
promote the possibility.  Accordingly, the labels should be retired and regulators who use 
them greeted with skepticism that they are operating under unfortunate by-products of 
jurisdictional competition. 
 
 Another way of concluding this analysis is to observe that the rhetoric of “rules-
based” versus “principles-based” as descriptions of complex regulatory systems is an 
instance of the common political habit of invoking binary classifications.  Examples 
appearing in certain styles of political discourse include the stunningly oversimplified 
labels of “the right” and “the left” or use of the phrase “both sides of the debate” when 
reducing complex disagreements to oversimplified binaries (as in “both sides of the 
rationality debate” or “both sides of the Iraq War debate”).  Political realities and 
positional complexities expose such labels as contextually false dichotomies.  
Unreflective invocation of binary labels in policy discourse retards rather than advances 
thoughtful dialogue.  In the case of binary classifications of complex regulatory systems, 
this impairs weighing the relative advantages of using various forms of provisions to 
achieve varying objectives.   
 
 If so, then it would be appealing to allow the simple labels to represent extreme 
ends of a spectrum, so that complex regulatory systems could range across a spectrum 
denominated at its poles by extreme principles-density to extreme rules-density.  A 
classificatory scheme could be constructed in which systems are located at descriptive 
positions across that spectrum.  Descriptive locations could include some terms suggested 
above, such as principles-heavy, principles-rich, rules-rich and rules-heavy.306  A 
challenge in devising such a descriptive spectrum, however, is that to establish such 
locations still requires highly-sophisticated classification and measurement tools that 
have not been developed (involving sorting individual provisions into notoriously 
unstable categories plus then accounting for how the individual provisions are applied 
and how they interact). 
 
                                                 
306  See supra text accompanying notes ___-___ (discussing how Professors Black and Kraakman dubbed 
as “self-enforcing” the model of corporate law for emerging economies, which devotees of the binary 
labels would be tempted to call rules-based and I referred to as rules-rich or rules-heavy); supra text 
accompanying notes ___-___ (discussing how the proposed British Columbia Securities Act advertised 
itself as principles-based and I referred to as principles-heavy or principles-rich). 
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 On the other hand, if it were possible to develop a reliable classification and 
measurement method to support such descriptive classifications, the refined taxonomy 
could be appealing.  It would displace the false binary.  That offers the advantage of 
faithfully reflecting the realities that individual provisions reside along a rules-principles 
continuum that is sometimes unruly and that complex regulatory systems exhibit relative 
vagueness with even more systemic unruliness.  So reflecting those realities in the 
discourse would rightly neutralize the rhetorical and political power of the false binary.  
That could improve capabilities in weighing the relative appeal of various forms of 
provisions in relation to objectives.  The inherent limitations of a quest to do so likely 
would lead to the more ultimate prescription made in this Article, through a fizzling out 
of the vocabulary altogether. 
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